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T h u s far the chief purpose of our military establishment
has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose
must be to avert them.
Bernard Brodie
The Absolute Weapon:Atomic Power and World Order
1946

Sixty years ago, the strategic analyst Bernard Brodie took
serious stock of the military threats and missions in a world
with atomic bombs. Brodie recognized that this new class of
weapons would cause intolerable destruction, and therefore that
the United States could no longer afford to wait for an enemy to
strike first. For much of the half century that followed, the
United States and its allies relied on deterrence and when
necessary limited conflicts to avert strikes such as the attack on
Pearl Harbor that had brought the United States reluctantly
into the Second World War. More recently, the nature of threats
that the United States and its allies face has changed; now,
enemies who cannot be deterred are seeking to possess weapons
of mass destruction. While the prospect of non-state messianic
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actors obtaining these weapons dramatically expands the range
of catastrophic threats, the means the military establishment
has to avert wars has not grown accordingly.
Because the international security system is premised on
exceedingly strong notions of national sovereignty, the United
States may not seize a shipload of nuclear weapons moving from
North Korea to Iran for ultimate use by terrorists. Russia may
not force the landing of an airplane carrying anthrax from the
Sudan to Chechnya until that craft enters Russian airspace. In
other words, terrorists, revolutionaries, and rogue states are
virtually free to ship weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as
they wish. Without some significant changes to the system, the
use of WMD against civilians seems all but inevitable.
This Article addresses one significant undertaking that
seeks to change the system by enabling concerned states to
interdict international trade in weapons of mass destruction. As
such, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI or the Initiative)
not only addresses one of the most urgent threats to peace and
security that the world has ever witnessed, but it does so in an
innovative way that has the potential to change the basic
paradigm of peace and security by legitimizing the proportional
and discriminating use of force to prevent a great harm.
This Article proceeds in seven Parts. Part I introduces the
Initiative and discusses some of the legal, political and strategic
issues it raises. A more detailed legal analysis follows in Part VI
but only after some analysis of the political and strategic issues
that drive the Initiative. Part I1 discusses the threats that the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction pose and the ways
that the Initiative seeks to address them. Precisely because the
PSI is "an activity not an organization" its structure and
activities have not been articulated with much detail. The PSI'S
founding document is a Statement of Interdiction Principles
reproduced in the appendix to this Article. Part I11 presents
those few operational details that are publicly available.
Likewise, the PSI'S amorphous structure leaves considerable
ambiguity about what it means to participate in the Initiative.
Part IV addresses what is entailed in joining the PSI. Part of the
Initiative's brilliance lies in its flexibility, but this design
element makes it difficult to identify who is participating and at
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what level. It also leaves open questions about whom the
Initiative targets. To date, the Initiative has focused on
operations to interdict the flow of weapons at sea, a prospect
that raises significant legal concerns because a theoretical
interdiction might contravene the strong tradition of freedom of
the seas. As noted above, Part V examines the legal framework
in which the PSI operates: the existing and potential legal
arguments that would or would not permit interdiction
shipments of WMDs. Part VI picks up the thread by examining
the efforts to deal with these legal issues through the essentially
political actions of the United Nations Security Council. Finally
Part VII draws some conclusions and makes a few concrete
recommendations about how to build support and improve the
fit between the PSI and its critical mission.
I.

INTRODUCTION:
THEPROLIFERATION
SECURITY
INITIATIVE
AND ITSOBJECTIVES

The Proliferation Security Initiative is a multilateral
initiative intended to prevent the proliferation of Weapons of
Mass Destruction (WMD) and the materials used to construct
them.' "The goal of the PSI is to create a more dynamic, creative,
and proactive approach to preventing proliferation transfers to
or from nation states and non-state actors of proliferation
con~ern."~
To accomplish this objective, the PSI establishes links
The
to facilitate information sharing between ~ountries.~
Initiative organizes multinational exercises to train for the
interdiction of these weapons on the high seas or the airspace
above them. The PSI'S activities are intended mostly to enable
its supporters to identify cross-border trafficking in WMD and to
halt it. It explicitly contemplates boarding ships and, if

1. U.S. DEP'TOF STATE, INT'L INFO. PROGRAMS, THE PROLIFERATION SECURITY
INITIATIVE
(June 2004), available at http://usinfo.state.gov/productdpubdproliferation
[hereinabr U.S. DEP'TOF STATE, INT'L INFO. PROGRAMS].
2. Id. In September 2003, eleven "countries agreed to and published the
Proliferation Security Initiative Statement of Interdiction Principles. These identify
specific steps for effectively interdicting weapons of mass destruction shipments and
preventing proliferation facilitators from engaging in this deadly trade. Participation is
voluntary. Id.
3. Id.
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necessary, using armed forces to seize weapons and the
materials used to make them.4 Its Statement of Interdiction
Principles also includes undertakings by its participants to
board and search vessels reasonably suspected of transporting
WMD, including their delivery systems, and to refrain from
transporting WMD themsel~es.~
Its signatories also undertake
to consider providing consent to boarding and searching vessels
carrying their flags.6 Subsequent bilateral agreements have
been signed to allow the United States to board ships bearing
flags of convenience under certain circu~nstances.~
Since its inception, the Initiative's efforts have focused on
halting the flow of WMD across the world's oceans. In the
future, its activities may extend to land-based interdictions.
Most of the participants in PSI exercises like these are the naval
and air forces of the United States and the various regional
powers that would presumably undertake any interdiction in the
future.
President George W. Bush announced the Initiative in
Krakow, Poland, on May 31, 2003.' A few months later, eleven
states signed a Statement of Interdiction Principles, a document
ambitious in scope but providing very few detailsg Since that
time, the PSI has gained widespread support from U.N.
Secretary General Kofi Annan and more than seventy states,
including those traditionally known as the "Great Powers,"
including Great Britain, France, Russia, Germany, Italy, Japan,

4. Id.
5. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,THEPROLIFERATION
SECURITY
INITIATIVE, STATEMENTOF
INTERDICTION PRINCIPLES(Sept. 4, 2003), available at http:/lusinfo.state.gov/produds/pu
bs/proliferation#statement bereinafter STATEMENT
OF INTERDICTION
PRINCIPLES]. This
material is reproduced in the appendix of this Article.
6. Id.
7 . See, e.g., John R. Bolton, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International
Security, Remarks with H.E. Arnulfo Escalona, Minister of Government and Justice of
Panama: Signing of the U.S.-Panama Ship Boarding Agreement to Support the
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) (May 12, 2004).
8. George W. Bush, President of the United States, Remarks by the President to
the People of Poland (May 31,2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releas
es/2003/05/20030531-3.html.
9. See STATEMENTOF INTERDICTION
PRINCIPLES,s u p m note 5.
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Turkey, and spain.'' Unfortunately, some states have not
endorsed it. This Article examines some of the reasons the
Initiative has not garnered universal support and proposes ways
to achieve it.
The Initiative is both bold and timely. It constitutes one of
the most important positive recent developments in the area of
international peace and security to date and may also add up to
the most exciting change in the area of public international law.
In particular, it may fundamentally alter the transnational legal
framework for the use of force by states. As it gains acceptance,
force may become a more ordinary tool for ensuring compliance
with the dictates of international security. By blurring the lines
between war and peace, the PSI permits the use of force to
advance security objectives without triggering the rubric of war.
And yet, despite the Initiative's novelty and importance, it has
attracted remarkably little scholarly or policy-relevant
attention." Moreover, because the Initiative lacks a central
office, an international secretariat, an operational handbook,
rules of engagement, and congressional authorization, it
remains somewhat shrouded in mystery.
While this novel Initiative is highly innovative in its
conceptualization, responding to one of the most urgent sets of
problems society faces, the PSI raises several significant legal

l o . U.S. DEFT OF STATE, FACT SHEET, PROLIFERATION SECURITY
INITIATIVE
FREQUENTLY
ASKED QUESTIONS(FAQ) (2005), available at http://www.state.gov/tJisn/rls/
fd46839.htm; U.S. Strategy to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction:
Hearing on Fiscal 2007: Emerging Threats Before the Subcomm. on Emerging Threats
and Capabilities of the S. Comm. on the Armed Serus., 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of
Robert G. Joseph, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International
Security); Fabrice Pothier, The Proliferation Security Znitiatiue: Towards A New AntiProliferation Consensus?, BASIC (BR. AM. SECURITYINFO. COUNCIL) NOTES, Nov. 18,
2004, available at http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Notes/BN041118.htm.
11. The PSI has been the subject of almost no in-depth reporting. The most
attention the Initiative has received from the media is in respect to the nomination of its
progenitor, then Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security
AtTairs John Bolton, to serve a s U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. In this respect,
the PSI has received scores of mentions in the national media but little analysis. For a
bibliography of the PSI and U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540, see Mark R.
Shulman, Proliferation Security Initiative and U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540
(Oct. 2005) (unpublished bibliography), http:/Aibrary.law.pace.edu/research/psibibliography.pdf.
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and policy issues in its implementation. The fact that it raises
issues should not be surprising. Significant changes to
international norms have always faced obstacles; that is the
nature of complex systems. Historical examples abound. For
instance, consensus was slow to form around such momentous
issues as the outlawing of piracy, the slave trade, and
eventually, genocide. More recently, the international
community has been hesitant to outlaw aviation piracy
or other
acts of terrorism. And now the international community is
halting and unsure about how to proceed in the face of nuclear
proliferation. The PSI is acting as a catalyst for the development
of a new norm that allows the use of force to interdict the flow of
WMD.
A definitive conclusion about the legal status of the
Initiative is elusive for several reasons related t o its lack of a
discernable structure. Different states have presented diverging
views of the relevant law that governs the Initiative's
activities.'' Also, because the PSI seeks to address proliferation
events as they arise, no one knows yet what actions its members
will take and, therefore, what legal arguments will be required
to support them. Finally, the PSI contains the seed of a new
kind of law-a universal ban on the proliferation of W M D ' ~ - ~ I I ~
this law has yet to be fully articulated, let alone tested.
As the lead participant, the United States' legal position is
critical and has been evolving since 2003. Then Undersecretary
of State John R. Bolton defended the PSI'S legality at the time
based on the right to collective self-defense.14This justification
proved to be overreaching. Other PSI core members failed to

12. See, e.g., Barry W . Coceano, The Proliferation Security Initiative: Challenges
and Perceptions, ATLANTIC
COUNCIL
OF THE U.S. (OCCASIONAL
PAPER),14-16 (2004),
available at http://www.acus.org/docdO4O5%20Proliferation~Security~Initiative~Challen
ges-Perceptions.pdf (discussing debates on the legal issues surrounding the Proliferation
Security Initiative).
13. STATEMENT
OF INTERDICTION
PRINCIPLES
supra note 5 .
14. John R. Bolton, Under Sec'y for Arms Control and Int'l Sec., U.S. Dep't of State,
Remarks to the Federalist Society: "Legitimacy"in International Affairs: The American
Perspective in Theory and Operation (Nov. 13, 2003), available at http://www.state.gov/
Vudd26143.htm.
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endorse it, and Secretary Bolton subsequently dropped it.'' More
recently, the U.S. State Department has vaguely claimed PSI
activities will be consistent with domestic and international
legal frameworks, many of which in turn implement existing
nonproliferation structures.16 While this claim is generally
accurate, it deserves detailed analysis and explanation to justify
it in the face of contrary claims and also to spell out some of the
opportunities that widespread endorsement of the PSI opens.
Going further, this Article will also argue that in order to
implement the PSI, its supporters are altering international law
in ways that may increase the scope and relevance of regulation
of the international security regime.
To meet a global threat, the PSI is ambitious in its
geographic scope. Traffic in WMD may originate almost
anywhere and, in light of the intention of some non-state actors
to obtain them," they may be bound for almost anywhere.
Countries of origin could include North Korea, Iran, China,
Syria, Pakistan, India, Israel, Vietnam, Sudan, Egypt, Yemen,
Cuba, Russia, and almost any of the other former Soviet

15. See Jofi Joseph, The Proliferation Security Initiative: Can Interdiction Stop
Proliferation?, ARMS CONTROLTODAY,June 1,2004, available a t http://www.armscontrol
.orglact/2004~06Noseph.asp.On the other hand, the PSI'S defenders found authority in
the U.N. Security Council Presidential Statement of January 1992, which stated that
IVMD proliferation is a threat to international peace and security and emphasized the
need for its prevention, and various political statements originating in the United
Nations and elsewhere. John Harrington, Arms Control and National Security, 38 INT'L
L. 391,392 (2004).
16. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI): A Record of Success (2005)
(testimony of Stephen G. Rademaker, Assistant Sec'y of State for Arms Control, Before
the H. Int'l Relations Comm., Subcomm. on Int'l Terrorism and Nonproliferation),
http:Nwww.state.govlt/adrls/d47715.htm.
17. See Jon B. Wolfsthal, The Next Nuclear Wave, FOREIGNAFF., Jan-Feb. 2005,
available a t http://www.foreignaffairs.orgl20050101fare~ewessay~114djonb%20wolfsthal/the-next-nuclear-wave.htm1 (citing GRAHAM ALLISON, NUCLEAR
TERRORISM:THE ULTIMATEPREVENTABLE
CATASTROPHE
Ch. 1 (2004) (providing a
distressing litany of non-state actors seeking to acquire nuclear weapons)). This list
includes: A1 Qaeda, its various related organizations and copycats operating around the
world; Jemaah Islamiyah (active in Southeast Asia); Chechen nationalists; and
Hezbollah (active in Lebanon and throughout the Middle East). Id. The list could also
include Majlis-e-Amal and other pro-Taliban anti-U.S. organizations operating in and
around Pakistan, Afghanistan, and countless doomsday cults around the world (similar
to Aum Shinrikyo or the Branch Davidians). Others might add Andean drug cartels.
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republics. From there, the weapons could be transshipped
anywhere on earth before arriving at their ultimate destination
or target. Therefore, the threat is global.
In the face of a global threat, who sets the strategy? The PSI
declarations to date leave ambiguous its decision-making
apparatus. Who will decide when and how to act? What role does
the United States play? Is the decision-making process entirely
ad hoc? The Statement of Interdiction Principles does not
establish any detailed policies relating to the Initiative's
purpose, decision-making apparatus, targets, or means.'' The
Statement of Principles does elaborate somewhat on the concept:
"States or non-state actors of proliferation concern"
generally refers to those countries or entities that the
PSI participants involved establish should be subject to
interdiction activities because they are engaged in
proliferation through: (1)efforts to develop or acquire
chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons and associated
delivery systems; or (2) transfers (either selling,
receiving, or facilitating) of WMD, their delivery
systems, or related material^.'^
This formal statement begs more questions than it answers. Is
there a list of states or non-state actors of concern? What is
required in order to establish that they should be subject to
interdiction activities? Are radioactive materials that could be
used to create radiological devices (i.e. dirty bombs) subject to
interdiction? Why are some states permitted to acquire WMD
and transfer them? Which states?
Informal statements do provide additional insights into the
Initiative's objectives. Its architect, John Bolton, has stated that
the Initiative will not target states that possess WMD
"legitimately."20This statement presupposes a legal conclusion
about legitimacy that can only be vaguely drawn in the absence
of established rules. Presumably it means that at least China,
Russia, Great Britain, and France will not be subjected to the
18. See id.
19. Id.
20. Wade Boese, The Proliferation Security Initiative: An Interview with John
Bolton, ARMS CONTROLTODAY,Dec. 2003, available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/20
03-12JPSI.asp.
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Initiative's interdiction efforts so long as they do not export
these weapons to rogue states or non-state actors." As long-time
declared nuclear powers under the terms of the Treaty on the
Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and each wielding
a U.N. Security Council veto, they appear to be insulated from
the reach of the PSI.
Other informal statements about the PSI'S objectives are
less vague but are self-contradicting. A British government
expert states that the PSI does
not target any country or countries in particular.
Rather, the goal is to prevent the development or
acquisition of WMD by all non-state actors (such as
terrorists) and states of concern, together with those
who supply such programmes through trafficking in
sensitive materials, equipment and technologywhether states, individuals, private companies or other

en ti tie^.^'

The fact that there are some "states of concern" appears to
belie the claim that the PSI does not target any countries in
particular. The ambiguity and tension inherent in that
statement are indicative of the fluidity of the Initiative. It does
not target any specific country while at the same time
21. The July 2003 PSI Meeting in Brisbane cited North Korea and Iran a s two
states of particular concern. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of State, Proliferation Security
Initiative: Chairman's Statement a t the Second Meeting (July 10, 20031,
http://www.state.gov/t/isnlrls/other/25377.htm [hereinafter PSI Chairman's Statement];
see also The Proliferation Security Znitiatiue: A Vision Becomes Reality (May 31, 2004)
(remarks of John R. Bolton, Under Sec'y for Arms Control and Int'l Sec., to the First
Anniversary Meeting of the Proliferation Security Initiative, http://www.state.gov/t/us/
d 3 3 0 4 6 . h t m (citing North Korea, Iran and Syria a s "states of proliferation concernn);
Andrew Prosser & Herbert Scoville, Jr., The Proliferation Security Znitiatiue in
Perspectiue, CTR. FOR DEF. INFO.,June 16, 2004, http://www.cdi.org/pdfs/psi.pdf(citing to
S123500, Jan. 31, 1992). For the purposes of this Article, WMD will include those
materials targeted by .the PSI a s components of WMD. Eventually, the distinction may
be enormous, but those distinctions will only arise with specific situations. It is also
worth noting that the sources may not be state actors, and that even governments have
elements that may be capable of proliferation without such acts being sanctioned by
state policy.
22. Letter from Matthew Hamlyn, Head, Parliamentary Relations and Devolution
Dep't, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to Committee Specialist (July 5, 2004),
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmselect/cmfaf 411441we27.htm
(emphasis added).
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preventing proliferation to or from states of concern. It is this
sort of ambiguity-and the apparent discretion it permits-that
causes some commentators to question whether the PSI
conforms to the rule of law.23Vague policy statements about
states of concern, however, are not the same thing as acts of
violence, and the PSI'S legitimacy cannot be prejudged on the
basis of these statements alone. Ultimately, the actions on the
behalf of the PSI and the law that governs those actions will
determine the Initiative's legitimacy. The outcomes will
illuminate its wisdom.
Likewise, it remains unclear how the PSI'S participants will
act if faced with information indicating that a shipment of WMD
originated in a state that is neither a party to the NPT,a longstanding nuclear power (Israel), nor a powerful state with
considerable international leverage such as India or ~ a k i s t a n . ~ ~
Given Pakistan's recent history and its apparent inability or
unwillingness to halt the export of WMD, claims that it will get
a free pass seem premature.25But as proliferation expert David
Albright notes, "This is the age-old problem with Pakistan and
the U.S. Other priorities always trump the United States from
coming down hard on Pakistan's nuclear proliferation. And it
23. Samuel E. Logan, The Proliferation Security Initiative: Navigating the Legal
L. & POL'Y 253, 256-63 (2005); see also Ian Patrick Barry,
Challenges, 14 J . TRANSNAT'L
The Right of Visit, Search and Seizure of Foreign Flagged Vessels on the High Seas
Pursuant to Customary International Law: A Defense of the Proliferation Security
Initiative, 33 HOFSTRAL. REV. 299, 301 (2004); Daniel H. Joyner, The Proliferation
Security Initiative: Nonproliferation, Counterproliferation, and International Law, 30
YALE J. INT'L L. 507 (2005).
24. Until North Korea's unprecedented announcement of its intention to withdraw
in 2003, India, Pakistan and Israel were the only major states not party to the NPT.
Devon Chaffee, North Korea's Withdrawal from Nonproliferation Treaty Oficial,
WAGINGPEACE.ORG,
Apr. 10,2003, http:Nwww.wagingpeace.org/articled2003/0411O~~haff
ee-korea-npt.htm. All state parties are required to permit inspectors to ensure their
nuclear materials are not diverted to illegal weapons programs. U.S. Statement at the
2005 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference (2005) (remarks of Stephen G.
Rademaker, Assistant Sec'y of State for Arms Control), http~//www.state.gov/t/adrls/rm/
45518.htm.
25. See Prosser & Scoville, supra note 21, a t 6. Pakistan's participation is
important. If President Pewez Musharraf believes that signing the PSI would be
domestically unpopular, he could sign it clandestinely. There is no reason that the
parties to the PSI must each sign a public declaration. In fact, private deals may make
sense and would be entirely legitimate-at least under international law.
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goes back 15 to 20 years."26Likewise, proliferation expert Gary
Milhollin notes "it seems bizarre that we are letting the
Pakistanis get away with nuclear smuggling because we think
they'll help fight terrori~m."~'However, the best evidence
publicly available suggests that India, Pakistan, and Israel will
not be targeted-at least for now.28
The case of Pakistan illustrates the PSI'S potential for
changing the use of force paradigm to achieve international
peace and security. Clearly, from a counter-proliferation
perspective, the PSI should not grant Pakistan a free ride. Other
important considerations arise, however, because of Pakistan's
One of
role as a critical ally in the struggle against terr~rism.~'
the PSI'S greatest strengths is the flexibility it offers. The
traditional international security order viewed the world as
governed by fully sovereign states with a small number of states
whose sovereignty is temporarily impaired--either because they
are "failed" states, client states, or those subject to U.N.
sanctions. Traditionally international law does not offer much
support to those seeking to discriminate between the rights of
diffeiment states based on an interpretation of their so-called
legitimacy. Instead it treats the legitimacy and sovereignty of all
states with equal dignity except in those few instances in which
states violate obligations that are either self-imposed by custom
or treaty, or imposed upon them by the U.N. Security Council.
In contrast, the PSI implies a less rigid concept of sovereign
autonomy in which a state no longer has complete freedom to
engage in reckless activities that endanger another's security.
The PSI must prevent weak states from trafficking in WMD
without further undermining their capacity to govern
themselves. The United States can neither afford to ignore

26. Josh Meyer, Illegal Nuclear Deals Alleged, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 26,2005, at A8.
27. Id.
28. See Wade Boese, Research Dir., Arms Control Ass'n, Presentation to the
Institute of Nuclear Materials Management Panel Discussion: Implications of U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1540 (Mar. 15, 2005), http://www.armscontrol.org/eventsl2OO
50315-1540.asp (citing speaker's recent i n t e ~ e w
with John Bolton).
29. See, e.g., Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec'y, President Bush
and President Musharraf of Pakistan Discuss Strengthened Relationship (Mar. 4, 2006),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/newslreleases/OO60304-2.html.
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Pakistan's proliferation nor to destabilize or alienate its
government.
Eventually the PSI must develop enough support that it can
halt proliferation from all countries, including powerful ones or
those that have special influence as allies in the global struggle
against terrorism. Granting free passes to oneself or one's
friends runs contrary to the basic principles of the rule of law. It
sets the grantor and the grantee above the law. The rule of law
is premised upon the notion that no one is above it, and for the
PSI to support a transnational order based on this principle, it
should do everything feasible to abide by the rule of law itself.
On the other hand, it may take years for supporters of the PSI to
establish the legal capacity to target important countries that
-proliferate. In the meantime, an excess of solicitousness for the
most robust interpretations of the rule of law should not be
permitted to cripple the entire effort. This Article proposes that
the best course is to embrace the objectives of the PSI and strive
to strengthen it as an important counter-proliferation tool.
A. A New Form of Multilateralism
The Initiative offers a new model for multilateral
cooperation that avoids cumbersome treaty apparatus. The
postwar system of international peace and security is framed in
great part by such treaties. From the beginning, the presidential
administration of George W. Bush has been notoriously
unfriendly to traditional multilateral conventions. Prior to
September 11, 2001, the Bush Administration abandoned
negotiations on START 11,~' decided not to ratify the
Comprehensive Test Ban rea at^,^^ and soon thereafter withdrew
the United States from the Anti-Ballistic Missile re at^.^' It
stalled efforts to improve the Biological Weapons Convention
30. Michael R. Gordon & David E. Sanger, To Sway Russia, Bush Will Propose
Cuts to Nuclear Arsenal, N.Y. TIMES,Nov. 2, 2001, at A6 (noting that Start I1 had still
not taken effect).
31. Tom Shanker & David E. Sanger, White House Wants to Bury Pact Banning
Tests of Nuclear Arms, N.Y. TIMES,Jul. 7,2001,a t Al.
32. Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec'y, ABM Treaty Fact Sheet:
Announcement of Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty (Dec. 13, 2001),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/l2/2OOll2l3-2.html.
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33

regime. It failed to encourage ratification of the U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea despite strong support in
Congress, the Department of State, and the Department of
~ e f e n s e The
. ~ ~ Bush Administration took the unprecedented
step of "un-signing" the 1998 Rome Charter of the International
Criminal Court. The Administration's antipathy to exposing
Americans to charges in international tribunals is so strong it
expended considerable diplomatic capital to ensure blanket
exemptions for Americans before the new International
Criminal Court despite the Rome Charter's provisions and
political considerations making any such prosecution
exceptionally unlikely.35
At the same time, the Administration's efforts to build
multinational coalitions have been widely derided as fig leaves
for unilateral action. These complaints, whatever their merit, do
not mean the Administration has been ignoring the roles other
states can play in maintaining peace and security. The PSI
represents a prominent example of the Administration's
thinking about how to build transnational support to protect
American interests. It envisions a new kind of multilateral
security agreement--one with considerable advantages over the
heavily negotiated and thus cumbersome treaties that lawyers
and diplomats are accustomed to creating. While it is beyond the

33. See Devon Chaffee, Freedom o r Force on the High Seas? Arms Interdiction a n d
International Law, WAGINGPEACE.ORG,
Aug. 15,2003, http://www.wagingpeace.org/articl
es/2003/08/15-chaffee-freedom-of-force.htm.
34. MARJORIE A. BROWNE, CONG. RES. SERV., THE U.N. LAW OF THE SEA
CONVENTION
AND THE UNITED STATES:
DEVELOPMENTS
SINCE OCTOBER 2003 (20051,
available a t http:lhKww.fas.org/sgp/crslrow/RS2l89O.pdf(noting that though it had been
voted favorably out of committee in the Senate and pushed by Department of State
officials, it languished in the 108th Congress).
35. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAUOF POLITICAL-MILITARY
AFFAIRS, AMERICAN
SERVICE-MEMBER'S
PROTECTION
Am (20031, available a t http://www.state.gov/tJpm/rls/
othr/misc/23425.htm. All this is in addition to the protections embodied both in the
United States' veto a t the Security Council and the Rome Charter's provisions for
complementarity, that is authorization for indictments only when the state does not have
the capacity to indict or investigate. The Rome Statute emphasizes "the International
Criminal Court established under this Statute shall be complementary to national
criminal jurisdictions." Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Pmbl., July
17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9, available a t http://www.un.orgAaw/icc/statute/
romefra.htm.
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scope of this Article to explore them all, other U.S.-led
transnational security initiatives since 9/11 should at least be
noted to give the reader an idea of their range and scope. In
addition to the PSI,^^ they include the Container Security
~nitiative,~' the
Customs-Trade
Partnerships
against
error ism,^' the Regional Maritime Security ~nitiative,~'
and the
Global Threat Reduction ~nitiative.~'Also, the PSI has a
nonproliferation analogue in the Global Partnership Against the
Each is
Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass ~estruction.~'
an activity, not an organization. Not one of the initiatives
established is chartered by a multilateral treaty that has been
signed and ratified by each participant. And yet, cumulatively,
these initiatives may be building a new system that responds
effectively and legitimately to the security demands of the
twenty-first century.

36. See generally Prosser & Scoville, supra note 21, a t 2; PSI Chairman's
Statement, supra note 21; STATEMENTOF INTERDICTION PRINCIPLES, supra note 5.
37. See U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, FACT SHEET (2006),
http://www.customs.gov/linkhandler/cgov/bsi~
fact-sheet.ctt/csi-fact-sheet.doc [hereinafter U.S. CUSTOMSFACT SHEET].
38. See U.S. CUSTOMSAND BORDERCONTROL,PARTNERSHIPTO SECURE THE
SUPPLY CHAIN:CUSTOMS-TRADE
PARTNERSHIP AGAINST TERRORISM,
http://www.customs.gov/xp/cgov/import/commercialeorcemenVctpaV (last visited Apr.
2, 2006).
39. See
Regional
Maritime
Security
Initiative, GLOBALSECUIRTY.ORG,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/rmsi.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2006)
[hereinafter RMSA.
40. See IAEA STAFF REPORT, IAEA WELCOMES US NEW GLOBAL THREAT
REDUCTION
INITIATIVE(2004), http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/2004/GTRIInitiative.htm1.
41. See Group of Eight Leaders, The G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of
Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (June 27, 2002), http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rl
s/othr/ll514.htm.
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Since the advent of the Nuclear Age, everything has
changed save our modes of thinking and we thus drift
toward unparalleled catastrophe.
Albert in stein^^
Weapons of mass destruction in the hands of terrorists
In the hands of a
present the greatest threat to our ci~ilization.~~
terrorist group, chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons could
cause the deaths of thousands, or even millions, of innocent
people. During a debate with Senator John F. Kerry during the
2004 campaign, President Bush said, "I agree with my opponent
that the biggest threat facing this country is weapons of mass
destruction in the hands of a terrorist network."44The more
widely such weapons are distributed, the more likely their use.
These weapons, or the means to build them, are increasingly
accessible to states and non-state actors alike. The threat of
widespread disease or death posed by naturally or

42. Robert Holt, Can Psychology Meet Einstein's Challenge?, POL. PSYCHOL. 5(2),
1984, a t 199-225 (citing a fund-raising letter for the Emergency Committee of Atomic
Scientists written by Albert Einstein in May 1946).
43. A note on terminology: any strategy to prevent WMD attacks has several
components, traditionally labeled "deterrence," "nonproliferation," "counter-proliferationn
and "preemption." Deterrence remains basically unchanged from its classic Cold War
formulation in which a potential adversary is dissuaded from launching an attack for
fear of a response that would more than negate the advantages gained by such an attack.
The concept of preemption has evolved over the years and is, indeed, in flux, due mostly
to the U.S. arguments (mostly related to the distinctions between preemption and
prevention) and actions in early 2003 leading up to the Iraq war. Nonproliferation is a
more complex set of efforts to limit the spread of technology, expertise, and weapons
through such means a s classifying weapons technology and otherwise limiting its export
or accessibility, enhancing border technologies and training personnel at border
crossings, sponsoring peaceful work of nuclear scientists, or building and maintaining
international verification systems. Counter-proliferation "focuses on more aggressive
activities, such a s covert action and military strikes. . . ." Frank J. Cilluffo et al., CSIS
REPORT,COMBATING
CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEARTERRORISM:
A COMPREHENSIVE
STRATEGY
xi (2001).
44. Presidential Debate in Coral Gables, Florida, 40 WEEKLYCOW. PRES. DOC.
2175, 2192 (Sept. 30, 2004); see also Graham Allison, The Gravest Danger, AM.
PROSPECT, Mar. 2005, at 48.
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unintentionally occurring agents such as zoonotic diseases45or
gigantic meteors46may eventually prove more deadly, but the
likelihood of these threats seems impossible to establish. The
eventual use of WMD against civilians seems likely. Harvard's
Graham Allison grimly forecasts that "on the current path, a
nuclear terrorist attack on America in the decade ahead is more
likely than not."47The PSI is one new tool in the effort to prevent
such attacks. One of its strengths is that it does not pretend to
be a silver bullet; rather it forms part of a growing network of
networks, each adding layers of security. A silver bullet might
miss its target, but a network of defenses would reduce the
threat with every layer.
A. Political Support from International Institutions
International support for the PSI is widespread but
ambivalent. As noted above, the U.S. government claims that at
least seventy nations are participating in the Initiative, but a
comprehensive statement listing those states and the actual
level of participation has not been released.4sIndividual states
that participate in the Initiative are discussed below. First,
however, this Article discusses the support of the most
politically significant international entities: the United Nations
and the European Union. Later, in Part VI, it will examine the
legal arguments to support counter-proliferationand the PSI.
The United Nations has endorsed the PSI concept but

45. William B. Karesh & Robert A. Cook, The Human-Animal Link, FOREIGN AFF.,
JulyIAug. 2005, at 38, 40 (explaining that zoonotic diseases "originated i n animals but
have crossed the species barrier to infect peoplen); see also Laurie Garrett, The Next
Pandemic, FOREIGN A m . , JulytAug. 2005, at 3 (explaining such threats generally).
46. See Evan R. Seamone, The Duty to "Expect the Unexpected": Mitigating Extreme
Natural Threats to the Global Commons Such as Asteroid and Comet Impacts with the
Earth, 41 COLUM.J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 735, 794 (2003)(discussing the legal consequences of
catastrophic events).
47. GRAHAM ALLISON, NUCLEAR TERRORISM:THE ULTIMATE PREVENTABLE
CATASTROPHE
15 (2004).
48. U.S. Strategy to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction:
Hearing on Fiscal 2007: Emerging Threats Before the Subcomm. on Emerging Threats
and Capabilities of the S. Comm. on the Armed Servs., 109th Cong. (2006) hereinafter
U.S. Strategy to Combat WMD] (statement o f Robert G. Joseph, Under Sec'y of State for
Arms Control and Int'l Sec.).
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stopped short of requiring its member states to pass legislation
to enact it when it passed Security Council Resolution 1540
(UNSCR 1540) in April of 2004.~'Secretary General Annan has
endorsed the PSI as integral to the nonproliferation regime:
"President Bush's Proliferation Security Initiative is another
The
important step. These measures must be fully enf~rced."~'
Secretary General's report, In Larger Freedom, noted that while
the NPT "remains the foundation of the non-proliferation
regime, we should welcome recent efforts to supplement it."51
Specifically, the report continues:
These [efforts] include Security Council Resolution 1540
(2004), designed to prevent non-state actors from
gaining access to nuclear, chemical and biological
weapons, technology and materials, and their means of
delivery; and the voluntary Proliferation Security
Initiative, under which more and more States are
cooperating to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear,
biological and chemical weapons.52
Likewise the United Nations' Report of the High-Level Panel
on Threats, Challenges and Change notes:
Recent experience of the activities of the A.Q. Khan
Network has demonstrated the need for and the value
of measures taken to interdict the illicit and clandestine
trade in components for nuclear programmes. This
problem is currently being addressed on a voluntary
basis by the Proliferation Security Initiative. We believe
that all States should join this voluntary i n i t i a t i ~ e . ~ ~
49. See S.C. Res. 1540, U.N.SCOR, 59th Sess., 4956th Mtg., U.N.Doc. SIRESl1540
(2004).
50. Kofi A. Annan, A Global Strategy for F i g h t i q Terrorism, THEHINDU, Mar. 12,
2005, available at http://www.hindu.com~2005/03/12/~tories/2005031206711100.htm.
51. See The Secretary General, Report of the Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom:
Towards Deuelopment, Security, and Human Rights for All, 1 100, deliuered to the
General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005), available at
www.un.org/largerfreedorn/report-largerfreedom.pdf(emphasis added to note the
recognition of an emerging norm that may ripen into customary international law).
52. Id.
53. The Secretary General, Report of the Secretary-General's High-leuel Panel on
Threats, Challenges, and Change, ¶ 132, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N.Doc.
A1591565 (Dec. 2, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/secureworld/report.pdf. The
father of the Pakistani, or the "Islamic bomb," Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, has confessed to

Heinonline - - 28 Hous. J. Int'l L. 788 2006

20061

PROLIFERATION SECURITY INTIATIVE

789

These statements contribute to the legitimacy of the PSI,
politically and morally. Their jurisprudential significance,
however, is ambiguous and evolving. At this point, the United
Nations' contributions to promoting the PSI, therefore, have
been essentially limited to the Secretary General's voicing of
support. And as long as China remains opposed, the United
Nations' vast authority under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter
will remain dormant with respect to the PSI.
After the United Nations, the European Union (EU) is
probably the next most significant source of the PSI'S political
legitimacy. The EU's position has evolved quickly over the past
couple of years with each new statement increasingly
supportive. The EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of
Mass Destruction promulgated by the European Council in
December 2003, did not explicitly mention the Initiative in its
position against proliferation. An otherwise comprehensive
document, it endorsed treaties and encouraged expansion of the
EU's role in enhancing verification regimes, assistance
programs, export controls, and other initiatives intended to
improve the security of WMD materials, equipment, and
expertise. It also included an ambiguous reference to considering
"measures aimed at controlling the transit and transshipment of
sensitive materials [and supporting] international initiatives
aimed a t the identification, control and interception of illegal
shipments."54
On the first anniversary of the Krakow announcement, the
EU and its member states went further and committed
"themselves to contribute to the PSI a n d . . . take the necessary
steps in support of interdiction efforts."55Somewhat cautiously,
this commitment required the EU and its member states to
selling nuclear weapons technology to Iran, Libya, and North Korea. Pakistan's
President Pervez Musharraf has confirmed that these transactions occurred but has
denied knowing about them at the time. See Esther Pan, Nonproliferation: The Pakistan
Network, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL.,Feb. 12, 2004, http://www.cfi.org/publication~7751/.
54. The Council of the European Union, EU Strategy Against Proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction, Council Common Position No 2003/805/CFSP, at 12,
available at http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cmsUpload/stl5708.enO3.pdf.
55. General Affairs & External Relations Council (GAERC), Non-proliferationSupport of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) (May 17, 2004), httpi/europa.eu.int
/comm/external~relations/nuclear~safety/ic.htm.
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"take the necessary steps in support of interdiction efforts to the
extent their national and Community legal authorities permit
and consistent with their obligations under international
law. . . .a56 This statement illuminates several important
distinctions between the U.S. and EU approaches to security
and terrorism issues generally. It is also notable because the EU
overcame these differences in defining the ultimate shape of the
still inchoate PSI.
First, the legal carve-outs in the EU endorsements are so
prominent as to raise questions about the EU's willingness to
commit at all. In contrast, only a few days earlier, a Japan-EU
Declaration on Disarmament and Nonproliferation included no
such carve-outs.57The addition of the carve-outs in the EU's PSI
statement seems like a blunt effort to cajole the United States to
assume a more respectful attitude toward the significance of the
rule of international law and the constraints it imposes on
decisions to use force. This difference implies that the EU is
willing to abandon the PSI if it engages in military activities
that are inconsistent with international law.
Second, the EU's endorsement emphasizes the intelligence
and law enforcement aspects of the PSI-not
its military
measure^.^' Similarly, at a recent PSI exercise hosted by Japan,
the Japanese government insisted that the Coast Guard play a
more prominent role than the Navy in an apparent effort to
emphasize the law enforcement aspects of the operation.59Many
members of the EU view the Bush Administration's 'War on
Terror" as a grave mischaracterization of the enemy and how

56. Id.
57. See Japan & The E.U., Japan-EU Joint Declaration on Disarmament and Nonproliferation (June 22, 2004), http://europa.eu.int/comm/external~relationdjap~summit
13-22-06-04ldisarm.htm (assigning cooperation in the context of PSI a s a priority area).
58. See EU-U.S. Declaration on the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction (June 26, 2004), http://europa.eu.int/comm/external~relations/udsumO6~O4d
ecl-wmd.pdf. ( W e fully subscribe to the Proliferation Security Initiative Statement of
Interdiction Principles and support efforts to interdict WMD shipments and enhance
cooperation against proliferation networks, including in intelligence and law
enforcement.").
59. See Dr. James A Boutilier, Reflections on the New Zndo-Pacific Maritime and
Naval Environment, POINTER
(2004), available a t http:Nwww.mindef.gov.sg/imindefl
publications/pointer/journald2004v3On2/features/feature6.html.

Heinonline - - 28 Hous. J. Int'l L. 790 2006

20061

PROLIFERA TION SECURITY INTIA TIVE

79 1

best to neutralize it. Instead, they view the threats posed by A1
Qaeda and other non-state actors as principally a criminal
matter best dealt with by law enforcement authorities, not the
military. So, while they have agreed to work with the United
States to halt trafficking in WMD, they believe nonmilitary
agencies such as the U.S. Coast Guard should conduct its
activities with the military playing supporting roles only as
necessary.
Third, the EU's statement is captioned "Non-proliferation"
not
"Counter-proliferation."
The
distinction
between
nonproliferation and counter-proliferation may be significant.
The Initiative's architect, John Bolton, has correctly
characterized the PSI as a "counter-proliferation" strategy, but
in the end "nonproliferation" may prove more politically viable
(if less accurateL6' The EU's characterization of the PSI as
nonproliferation raises the concern that it may reveal an
impulse to dilute the Initiative's military mission. Such an
impulse should be resisted because the greatest strength of the
PSI lies in the willingness of its supporters to use force if
necessary to prevent proliferation.
Another innovation of the PSI'S counter-proliferation regime
is its focus on the weapons and materiel and not on the states.
The PSI targets the weapons-not the parties interested in
acquiring them. The source or intended recipients are legally
and effectively significant but only insofar as certain intended
recipients are privileged to receive WMD. When the maritime
powers sought to end piracy in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, they did not destroy harbor cities such as New
Orleans, Cartagena and Port-au-Prince that welcomed pirates.
Instead, they hanged pirates. When Great Britain sought to end
the trans-Atlantic slave trade in the nineteenth century, it did
not embargo the United States, Brazil or ~ u b a . " Instead it
captured slave ships and returned their passenger-cargo to
~ f r i c aIn
. ~this
~ way, the PSI is less like an embargo or a war
60. See John Bolton, An All-Out War on Proliferation, F I N . TIMES,
Sept. 7, 2004,
available at http://www.state.govltJus/d36035.htm.
61. Michael A. Becker, The Shifting Public Order of the Oceans: Freedom of
Navigation and the Interdiction of Ships at Sea, 46 HARV. INT'LL.J.131,208(2005).
62. Id.
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and more like a movement for the suppression of a vice.
Consequently, it will help formulate a base norm that could
eventually rise to the level of universal norms, much as the bans
on piracy and slave trade did. The PSI does not appear to target
states as an embargo or war would. Embargoes and wars must
ultimately come to an end while universal norms endure. To
construct a strong norm against proliferation, one should not
look only to states for support. Also, the suppression of vice
metaphor helps to explain in part the US.-EU split over how to
characterize the challenge. The U.S. government views the PSI
as part of a war on terror because of the military means
necessary to implement it, while the EU mostly views it as a law
enforcement issue because the enemy is not a state against
which one declares war. The PSI may have achieved such
widespread support in part because it need not characterize its
actions as either war or law enforcement.
Likewise, by targeting WMD rather than countries, the PSI
creates a sanctions regime that has considerable advantages
over embargoes and other counter-proliferation strategies.
Because it specifically targets WMD, as well as materials used
to construct them and the systems used to deliver them, it offers
the prospect of an "exceptionally smart sanction." Traditional
sanctions have become disfavored as tools of coercion. They
overreach, preventing any goods from moving into a country or
region, even necessities such as food, infant formula, or
medicine. This lack of discrimination harms and alienates
innocent people who have little or no ability to affect their
government's behavior. So-called smart sanctions have similar
shortcomings. They feed corruption and fail to alter the policy or
behavior in question. An interdiction of WMD at sea would not
constrain the flow of food, clean water, or medicine.
Consequently, it does not lead to any collateral damage.
Likewise, a specific interdiction does not threaten the health
and safety of sailors on untargeted ships-those that are
engaged in legitimate activities-unlike
other maritime
blockades. Also, it avoids the perils of smart sanctions because
no new trading system is required; it creates no incentives or
mechanisms for corruption. Although there is always the risk of
mistakes, abuses, and the outbreak of war or other escalations of
conflict, the PSI does appear to offer an almost perfectly
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discriminating sanction.
Another significant advantage of the PSI over more
traditional nonproliferation regimes is that it was brought into
being swiftly and can adapt deftly to changing circumstances.
Revising treaties to bring them into alignment with changed
circumstances is at best a lengthy process. On the other hand,
the ability to adapt quickly means the level of enthusiasm or
support may also change quickly; participants can drop out at
virtually any time and for any reason. Participants are bound
neither by custom nor by treaty-at least until a strong norm
develops. Indeed, it will be interesting to see whether some
mechanism evolves for ensuring signatories remain in the PSI
and adhere to its principles even when doing so would be
awkward, inconvenient, or perilous for a member or a
nonmember participant. States may wish to find ways to bind
themselves in order to insulate their governments from political
pressures to defect. No doubt the Bush Administration has been
frustrated by the withdrawal of Spanish troops from Iraq
Hence the
following the attack bombings of March 11, 2004.~~
principal shortcoming of coalitions of the willing: the enemy can
alter a coalition member's willingness to persist. The same can
be said for many of the legacy, nonproliferation regimes. Export
control regimes, for instance, are entirely voluntary in an
international system in which state sovereignty is nearly
sacrosanct; effective enforcement of security norms remains
exceptionally difficult-in multilateral regimes as in coalitions
of the willing. One way to reduce the freedom to defect would be
for the strong states to sign agreements with longer termination
periods or with obstacles such as binding arbitration. In the end,
however, state sovereignty will always trump any such efforts.

63. For a detailed account of the Madrid train attacks that occurred on March 11,
2004, see Madrid Train Attacks, http:llnews.bbc.co.uWl/hi~inindepth/europd2OO4madrid
-train-attacks/default.stm (last visited Mar. 31, 2006).

Heinonline - - 28 Hous. J. Int'l L. 793 2006

794

HOUSTON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LA W

[Vol. 28:3

B. National Security
History will judge harshly those who saw this coming
danger but failed to act.
National Security Strategy of the United States of ~ m e r i c a ~ ~
The integrity of the PSI, therefore, depends on the extent to
which it promotes national interests. The U.S. commitment to
the PSI is reflected in the National Security Strategy of the
United States of America:
The gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the
crossroads of radicalism and technology. Our enemies
have openly declared that they are seeking [WMD], and
evidence indicates that they are doing so with
determination. The United States will not allow these
efforts to succeed.. . . In the new world we have
entered, the only path to peace and security is the path
of action.65
Likewise, the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass
Destruction-a document which is relatively thin on details or
explanations about how such a strategy can be implementedincludes a statement about U.S. interests that lends credibility
to the PSI. 'Weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-nuclear,
biological, and chemical-in the possession of hostile states and
terrorists represent one of the great security challenges facing
the United States . . . . We will not permit the world's most
dangerous regimes and terrorists to threaten us with the world's
most destructive weapons."66While the strategy does promise to
extend new international arrangements to support
nonproliferation, it does not explicitly contemplate new
arrangements to support counter-proliferation except to note
that "WMD represent a threat not just t o the United States, but
also to our friends and allies and the broader international

64. WHITE
HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY
STRATEGY
OF THE UNITED
STATES
OF
AMERICA (20021,available at http://www.state.gov/documentdorganizatiodl5538.pdf
65. Id.
66. WHITE HOUSE, NATIONALSTRATEGY
TO COMBAT WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION (2002),available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/newdreleases/2002ll2lWM
DStrategy.pdf.
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community. For this reason, it is vital that we work closely with
like-minded countries on all elements of our comprehensive
proliferation strategy."67The national strategy's Manichaean use
of the term "like-minded," however, undermines its credibility as
an expression of U.S. interests. Peoples' minds change often.
States do not possess minds. The United States would be better
served by a document and a strategy premised on cooperation
with those sharing our interests.in peace and security. Pakistan,
Iran, and North Korea are not like-minded with the PSI'S
supporters, but the United States and its allies should endeavor
to bring these states into the Initiative regardless of their
mindset.
Virtually all states share an interest in keeping WMD out of
the hands of those who would use them. While the ultimate
objective of the PSI is to halt the flow of WMD and those
materials used to create them, merely making proliferation
more difficult and expensive should reduce the threats these
weapons pose. The PSI offers to do this by reducing the number
of parties that have access to them and by reducing the number
and lethality of such weapons that do get shipped. In light of the
potential harms these weapons pose, the PSI need not be
perfectly drafted or perfectly successful to be exceptionally
valuable. Once a weapon of mass destruction is used, every
effort to reduce the number and severity of subsequent attacks
will seem even more urgent than preventing the first such
attack appears today.
111. HOW DOES THE PSI WORK?
As articulated in the Statement of Interdiction Principles,
the PSI adds three significant tools to the counter-proliferation
kit.68 First, it increases the sharing of intelligence between
participating states to track the flow of WMD, including the
components and tools t o make them and the systems to deliver
them. Second, it promotes increased operational cooperation
among participating states to prepare for and plan t o interdict
WMD if necessary. Third, it promulgates robust interdiction
67. Id.
68. STATEMENT
OF INTERDICTION
PRINCIPLES,
supra note 5.
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principles that commit participants to use force if necessary to
halt the flow of WMD. This subpart will discuss these tools in
order.

A. Intelligence Sharing and Operational Cooperation
First, the Initiative's intelligence-sharing component has
drawn widespread praise as a step in the right direction. Who is
against breaking down the intelligence stovepipes to increase
operational effectiveness? However, there exists precious little
information on which to base a discussion about what, how, by
whom, and with whom intelligence is shared. Instead, we are
left with questions, some of which raise legal issues. Congress
has not authorized the PSI or any funds for its a~tivities.~'
Should legislation be amended to enable the U.S. Government to
share intelligence with those lacking appropriate clearances or
with states with which we do not generally share? Does any of
this shared information violate domestic privacy laws, either in
the United States, the European Union or elsewhere? Are
suspected traffickers in WMD due any special process? For
instance, what constitutes the reasonable suspicion standard for
boarding a vessel? Presumably this suspicion can be based on
secret information that the boarding party is unwilling to
disclose, but where is this standard expressed? And as for the
information shared, are there limitations on what can be shared
or with whom? Must they be states? Can the United States
share misinformation to test the integrity of those with whom it
shares the information?
Second, the Initiative's operational elements are not widely
understood because they have not been widely reported.
Elsewhere in this Article the various exercises are mentioned,
but little detail is available to explain the operational elements
of the PSI. Presumably, operational detail will only be available
upon specific instances of interdictions. To date, attention has
focused on the interdiction principals themselves.

69. Robert Gard, Non-Proliferation Agenda for Congress: The FY 2005 Budget
Process, CENTERFOR ARMS CONTROL
AND NON-PROLIFERATION,
Apr. 1, 2004,
http://www.armscontrolcenter.org/archivedOOO233.php.
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B. Interdiction
Third, the Initiative's most clearly articulated and
contentious contribution is the commitment to interdict WMD
shipments when necessary to prevent proliferation.70To date,
most of the attention has been on this ambitious tool. The need
to develop such a mechanism drives the PSI. And while
exercises and the few PSI operations have focused on
interdiction at sea, these operations may eventually mean that
armies enter sovereign and neutral countries to seize a
shipment of WMD. The PSI'S institutional basis lies not in a
charter or a treaty but in the Statement of Interdiction
Principles signed by eleven countries in September 2003.~'This
agreement commits signatories to interdict nuclear, biological,
and chemical weapons and the delivery systems or materials
used for making them as they move from or to "states or nonstate actors of proliferation concern."72
Determining what falls into the category of "materials used
for making" weapons presents innumerable complications
because most such materials are dual-use or because various
countries may have vested interests in trading them. This sort of
determination will ensure the PSI never becomes a clear-cut
enterprise, nor is there any reason to believe it could or should
be simple or easy. Indeed, if this type of determination were
simple, then there would be no need for either the International
Atomic Energy Agency or the World Trade Organization.
Likewise, this kind of complexity explains in part why slaves are
still traded and piracy is still committed in the twenty-first
century.
In an age of powerful distributed systems (that is, networks
of desktop and laptop computers, rather than individual
supercomputers), and in which the once near-complete
dominance of the nation-state is giving way to a variety of
entities with overlapping jurisdictions at multiple levels-for
example,
international,
transnational,
and
regional
70. See STATEMENT
OF INTERDICTION
PRINCIPLES,supra note 5 .
71. See generally SHARON SQUASSONI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., REPORT FOR
CONGRESS:PROLIFERATION
SECURITY INITIATIVE (PSI) 2 (2005).
72. Id. at 6.
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organizations; states, sub-states, multinational enterprises, and
nongovernmental organizations; and an increased role for the
individual-it
seems logical that some important security
functions should become more flexible and rely on distributed
decision-making functions rather than state actors and the
United Nations. In several important ways the U.N. Security
Council, as envisioned by its 1945 Charter, was a model of midtwentieth century structures with its highly-centralized, statedominated decision-making apparatus. The PSI seems like a
more appropriate decision-making apparatus for the twenty-first
century. Its authority is diffused and opportunistic. The means
at its disposal are more diverse, and the dichotomy between the
law of war and the law of peace is blurred.
THE PSI AND WHATARE THEYDOING?
IV. WHOSUPPORTS

As noted above, the PSI'S flexible design and lack of a formal
organization make it difficult to evaluate the support it receives.
In some instances, supporters and targets may even be the same
if, for instance, Chechen separatists were to seek t o purchase a
nuclear weapon. In that case, Russia is a supporter and a state
of concern. This Part discusses the fluid nature of support for
the PSI and what it is doing so far.
A. Supporters and Participants
Over seventy countries-constituting a majority of the
world's maritime fleet and the vast preponderance of its naval
might-are
participating in the PSI at some
There
appear to be several categories of participants in the PSI. Each
participant is a state. Core members are signatories to the
Statement of Interdiction Principles, and each has a navy or
other maritime defense force that could contribute substantially
to an interdiction operation. Other states participate at various
levels. At least five states that register significant shipping
fleets have signed bilateral agreements to allow the United
States to board ships in their fleet in order to halt WMD
73. See Mark T . Esper & Charles A. Allen, The PSI: Taking Action Against WMD
Proliferation, THEMONITOR
4 (2004), available at http://www.uga.edu/cits/documents/pdf
/monitor/monitor-sp_2004.pdf; see also U.S. Strategy to Combat WMD, supra note 48.
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shipments.74Other than the Statement of Interdiction Principles
and these boarding agreements, the PSI has no charter or other
foundation document. The PSI is neither an organization nor is
it governed by a treaty.
The participants include: Australia, Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Russia, Singapore, Spain, and the United Kingdom, as
well as the United
According to the State Department,
dozens of other countries are participating in one way or
another.76And while a coalition of the willing may not be a
particularly meaningful phrase when it comes to manning or
supporting combat operations in Iraq, there may well come a
day when the participation of Bulgaria or Bosnia-Herzegovina in
the PSI'S activities does make a significant difference.
Russia joined the PSI in May 2004--a signal moment in the
Initiative's history in terms of increasing its legitimacy and
effecti~eness.~~
Russia currently has some 8,000 nuclear
warheads and the materials to assemble an estimated 80,000
78
more. Russia's arsenal is far and away the largest potential
source of "loose nukes."79Many of these weapons and materials
are secured by nothing more than a padlock and an unarmed
Russia's participation in any counter-proliferation effort
is critical. Russia's signing on also facilitated passage of UNSCR
1540.
74. CHATHAM HOUSE, SHIP-BOARDING:AN EFFECTIVE MEASURE AGAINST
TERRORISM AND WMD PROLIFERATION 1-2 (2005),http:/hvww.chathamhouse.org.uk/
pdflresearch/il/ILP241105.doc.
75. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,INT'L INFO. PROGRAMS,
supra note 1;see also Robert G.
Joseph, Remarks to the Fletcher School Conf. on the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction: Applying the Bush Administration's Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass
Destruction to Today's Challenges (2005),http://www.state.gov/t/uslrml55601.htm.
76. John R. Bolton, Under Sec'y for Arms Control and Int'l Sec., Stopping the
Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Asian-Pacific Region: The Role of the
Proliferation Security Initiative, Remarks at Tokyo America Center (Oct. 27, 20041,
http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/37480.htm.
77. Wade Boese, Russia Joins Proliferation Security Initiative, ARMS CONTROL
TODAY,July-Aug. 2004,available at http://www.armscontrol.org/acV2004407-OWpsi.asp.
78. Allison, supra note 44.
79. RICHARDA. CLARK, ET AL., DEFEATINGTHE JIHADISTS: A BLUEPRINTFOR
ACTION,135--36,141 (2004).
80. Allison, supra note 44.
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According to The Economist, China has "said a few kind
words" about the PSI." China is the only member of the U.N.
Security Council's permanent five members that has not signed
on.82 Unlike Russia, China does not appear to pose a significant
risk as a source of loose nukes. While it has a significant nuclear
arsenal, these weapons appear to be relatively well secured. For
China, then, there are really two significant issues. First is the
role China can play in bolstering or denying legality and
legitimacy to the PSI. At the most obvious level, with China's
support, the U.N. Security Council could pass a resolution that
would explicitly authorize the use of all necessary means to halt
the proliferation of WMD-a "super" Resolution 1540 that would
alleviate any concern about the PSI'S legality. The second issue
arises out of China's role as the principal patron of North Korea.
Without China's protection, North Korea's government would
face the full force of the international community. It seems,
however, that absent the emergence of a new threat to China
from a non-state entity with access to WMD, the People's
Republic will not fully endorse the PSI.
India and Pakistan have both been declared nuclear powers
since their respective 1998 tests of nuclear weapons.83Neither
had signed the NPT, so no legal obligations were violated. While
India has not yet joined the PSI, it appears to be laying the
groundwork for doing so by constructing a series of sensors
designed to detect the passage of nuclear materials near its vast
~oastline.'~Given the historical tensions with its neighbor

81. Dealing with North Korea, Again: When the partying has to stop, T m
ECONOMIST,
Feb. 12, 2005, at 39,40. But see William Hawkins, Hu's Running the Show?,
NAT'LREV. ONLINE,
Sept. 12,2005, available at http://www.nationalreview.com/commen
t/hawkins200509120808.asp (claiming that China eviscerated UN Security Council
Resolution 1540's support for the PSI); Edward Lanfranco, China won't sign on to PSI,
WASH.TIMES,
Sept. 2, 2005 (citing China's concerns about the legality of interdictions).
82. See Wade Boese, The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) at a Glance, ARMS
CONTROL
ASS'N, Sept. 2005, http~/m.armscontrol.org/factsheets/psi.asp.
83. Michael L. Feeley, Note, Apocalypse Now? Resolving India's and Pakistan's
Testing Crisis, 23 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 777, 777 (2000).
84. See Guarding Against Shipments of WMDs, FIN. EXPRESS, Jan. 31, 2005; see
generally India Soon to Join A US-Led Security Group, INDIAN EXPRESS, Jan. 30, 2005
(referring to PSI as more politically sensitive than another US.-led initiative, the
Container Security Initiative).
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Pakistan, and the fact that A.Q. Khan, Pakistan's leading
nuclear scientist, has already exported atomic weapons and the
tools and materials to fabricate them, it seems only a matter of
time before India joins the PSI.^^ Possible Indian concerns that
Pakistan will be given a free pass by the PSI may be causing it
to withhold its participation until it is assured that Pakistan
will be included in any list of states of concern.86At the same
time, India has expressed some misgivings it shares with
Pakistan about the legitimacy of UNSCR 1540's imposition of
obligations on countries that do not have a vote in the Security
Perhaps President Bush's recent decision to allow
India to export peaceful nuclear materials will encourage India
to sign on.''
Pakistan presents a more complex story in great part
because of its inability to control its own nuclear materials.
When news broke that A.Q. Khan was at the center of a
transnational trading network and that he had made numerous
trips to Pyongyang, the government of Pervez Musharraf
averred that it was unaware of and had no control over the deals
being s t r ~ c k . This
' ~ lack of control is troubling-more than the
kind of control Pyongyang exerts over its own subjects' ability to
export WMD.
The PSI activities consist of meetings, exercises, efforts
toward planning or sharing information, and any interdictions
that eventuate. PSI exercises are the most visible display of the
-

85. MINISTRY OF EXTERNALAFFAIRS, NEW DELHI, Q. 2543 PROLIFERATION
SECURITY INITIATIVE (2005), http://meaindia.nic.in~par1iament/rs/2005/03/24rs30.htm
(stating "[tlhere has been no formal invitation to India to join the PSI so farn).
86. Premvir Das, PSI From a n Indian Perspective, in 4 CSIS ISSUES & INSIGHTS, a t
3 2 , 3 3 4 4 , July 2004, available a t http~/'~~~.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/
v04n05%5B1%5D.pdf (citing a concern that PSI might not be lawful).
87. Siddharth Varadarajan, India, Pak Join Forces Against US Move, TIMES OF
INDIA, Apr. 23, 2004, available a t http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com~articleshow/
636138.cms
88. The Bush Administration's Non-Proliferation Policy: Successes a n d Future
Challenges (2004) (testimony of John R. Bolton, Under Sec'y of Arms Control and Int'l
Sec., Before the House Int'l Rel. Comm.), available a t http://www.state.g0v/t/us/rm/31029
.htm.
89. Implication of U.S.-India Nuclear Energy Cooperation, 109th Cong. (2005)
(testimony of Ashton B. Carter, Co-Dir., Preventive Defense Project, Hearing Before the
Comm. on Senate Foreign Relations).
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Initiative's work-short of the actual interdictions. At least nine
meetings have also been held." According to the State
Department, "dozens of countries have participated in or
observed a t least one of the PSI interdiction exercise^."'^ As of
spring 2004, the PSI participants had completed four maritime
(in the Pacific, the Mediterranean, and the Arabian Sea), and
one air interception exercise (over Italy) as well as one tabletop
air interception exerci~e.'~
In August 2005, a fifth maritime
exercise dubbed Deep Sabre was held in the neighborhood of
~in~a~ore.'~

B. Early Successes?
Beyond these exercises, the PSI supporters claim that two
actual interdictions have already contributed significantly to the
promotion of peace and security. Most notably, John Bolton
claimed that the "interception, in cooperation with the U.K.,
Germany, and Italy, of the BBC China, a vessel loaded with
nuclear-related components, helped convince Libya that the
days of undisturbed accumulation of WMD were over, and
helped unravel A.Q. Khan's n e t ~ o r k . " While
'~
Mr. Bolton's claim
may gloss over a number of details that would tell a more
nuanced story, the fact is that Libya is moving with great speed

90. Henry J. Cordes, 19 Nations Hold Talks in Omaha on WMD Spread, OMAHA
WORLD-HERALD, Mar. 27,2005, a t B3; note 141, a t 2.
91. BUREAU OF NONPROLIFERATION,
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, UNITED STATES
INITIATIVES TO PREVENTPROLIFERATION,
May 2, 2005, http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/oth
erl45456.htm.
92. Esper & Allen, supra note 73. The authors are respectively Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Negotiations Policy and Deputy General Counsel for
International M a i r s in the U.S. Dep't of Defense. THE MONITOR is a publication of the
Center for International Trade and Security of the University of Georgia. This issue was
dedicated to a survey of the PSI.
93. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, SINGAPORE
HOSTS MULTINATIONAL MARITIME
INTERDICTION EXERCISE (2005), http://usinfo.state.gov/is/Archive/2005/Aug/15-878756.
html.
94. Bolton, supra note 60. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has announced that
the PSI was "responsible for 11interdictions." SQUASSONI,
supra note 71, a t 3. The issue
of whether this operation should be attributed to the PSI remains controversial; the
State Department is now backing off this claim. Wade Boese, Letter to the Editor, False
Claims of PSI Success, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2005, at A16.
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to conform to international norms,95and Dr. Khan is out of
business. Any contribution made by the PSI to these significant
steps should be highly encouraging. In light of such successes,
one might wonder why the PSI was not launched years ago. The
answer to such a question may be revealed in a discussion of the
political and legal obstacles it faces.

The supporters of PSI must contend with the fact that a ship
flying the flag of one state on the high seas is generally immune
from interference by forces of another state.96 This basic
principle underlies much of international law and poses
significant issues for those seeking t o justify a nonpermissive
interdiction on the high seas..

A. Freedom of the Seas
The first principle of maritime law remains that ships flying
the flag of one country are immune to the jurisdiction of
another.97This base norm of international law is subject to
several important exceptions developed through custom and
treaty over the cent~ries.~'
However, should any reader find this
rule quaint or antiquated, she should recall that throughout
history boarding another country's ships without legal
justification has been deemed an act of war and responded to in
kind." The 1731 boarding of,the English ship Rebecca, and the
severing of Captain Robert Jenkins' ear, sparked general war in
Europe. Likewise, the British embargo of Napoleonic Europe
earned it unintentional enemies: the United States entered into
a side war in 1812, principally to defend freedom of the seas. A
leading scholar of the subject notes:

95. See Gawdat Bahgat, Nuclear Proliferation and the Middle East, 4 J. OF SOC.,
POL., AND ECON. STUD.¶4 (2005).
96. For a valuable history of this principle and the wider context, see John W.
Coogan, THE END OF NEUTRALITY:
THEUNITEDSTATES, BRITAIN,AND MARITIME RIGHTS,
1899-1915, at 17 (Cornell Univ. Press 1981).
97. Id.
98. See generally id. at 17-29.
99. Id. at 17,31.

Heinonline - - 28 Hous. J. Int'l L. 803 2006

804

HOUSTON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LA W

[Vol. 28:3

If the world wars of 1793-1815 established one legal
principle beyond challenge, it was that neither
belligerents nor neutrals could dictate maritime law.
Future law, like past law, would be shaped by
belligerents and neutrals balancing contradictory
interests on the seas against the political and strategic
implications of possible policies.100

B. Exceptions to Freedom of the Seas
Sensitive to the importance of freedom of the seas, President
John F. Kennedy meticulously crafted the "quarantine" of Cuba
in October 1962 and had the Organization of American States
authorize it in order to minimize the risk that the Soviet Union
would view the seizure of ships as an act of war.''' The same
concern remains very much alive today. Shortly after the
launching of the PSI, North Korea described it "as a 'brigandish
naval blockade' akin to 'terrorism in the sea and a gross
violation of international law.' The official daily Rondong
Sinmun proclaimed, 'nobody can vouch that this blockade
operation will not lead to such a serious development as an allout
Notably, North Korea does not have a significant
100. Coogan, supra note 96,a t 20.
101. Becker, supra note 61,at 215.
102. See Rebecca Weiner, Proliferation Security Initiative to Stem Flow of WMD
Matkriel, CENTER FOR NON-PROLIFERATION
STUDIES, July 16, 2003, available a t
http://cns.miis.edufpubslweeW030716.htm (citing to Samantha Maiden, THE
ADVERTISER,July 14, 2003, and Nicholas Kralev, U.S. Seeks Asian Aid for Ship
Searches, WASH. TIMES, (June 17, 2003).While I cannot read Korean, I would be very
interested to know who translated the Korean characterizations, particularly the word
"brigand."
Intriguingly, Selig S. Harrison has recently called into question whether North Korea is
actually developing a program to enrich uranium to weapons grade-a question already
settled in the court of public opinion:
Much has been written about the North Korean nuclear danger, but one
crucial issue has been ignored: just how much credible evidence is there to
back up Washington's uranium accusation? Although it is now widely
recognized that the Bush Administration misrepresented and distorted the
intelligence data it used to justify the invasion of Iraq, most observers have
accepted a t face value the assessments that the Administration has used to
reverse the previously established U.S. policy toward North Korea.
Selig S. Harrison, Did North Korea Cheat, FOREIGN AFF., Jan./Feb. 2005,a t 99, available
a t http://www.foreignaffairs.org/2005010lfaessay84109/selig-s-ha~son~did-north-korea-
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naval force that could somehow retaliate in kind were a PSI
member to interdict one of its otherwise lawful shipments. This
inability to respond proportionately could actually backfire and
trigger general war on the Korean Peninsula. If the United
States wishes to gain legitimacy for the PSI as a multilateral
initiative, it must strive for "both wider international
participation and institutional safeguards to restrain its own
power."103Until then, states such as North Korea will be able to
denounce the PSI as an arbitrary tool for powerful states to
wield unilaterally against weaker states.
While unilateral action can radically destabilize
international relations, instability is sometimes necessary to
develop a humane new norm. The United States and its original
PSI have taken an appropriate first step and can now guide the

cheat.htm1 (arguing that the Administration has exaggerated intelligence that may only
prove lower levels of enrichment that are permitted under the NPT). If North Korea is
not capable of exporting WMD,then PSI does not have much of a purpose. Unfortunately
for Harrison's thesis, however, North Korea's government acknowledged its nuclear
weapons program in February 2005. Robert S. Norris & Hans M. Kristensen, North
Korea's Nuclear Program, BULL. ATOMICSCIENTISTS, M a y J u n e 2005, a t 64, available at
http://www.thebulletin.org/article~nn.php?artrtoh=mj05no~s.
This claim could be
fraudulent and intended to secure, for North Korea, the deterrence that such a program
would provide.
On the other hand, most analysts accept the North Korean government's word (and that
of the U.S. Government) on this subject. Brookings Scholar Michael O'Hanlon, for
instance, takes Korean nuclear weapons as a given and expresses concern that "the
economic pressures that help motivate North Korea's arms sales, counterfeiting, and
drug smuggling remain powerful." Michael O'Hanlon, The North Korean Nuclear Threat,
CHRON.HIGHER EDUC., Apr. 1,2005, at B12, available at https://www.brookings.edu/
views/articles/ohanlon~20050401.htm.
Likewise, journalist Tomas Friedman argues:
North Korea's nuclear program could be stopped tomorrow by the country
that provides roughly half of North Korea's energy and one-third of its food
supplies-and that is China. All China has to say to Kim Jong I1 is: You will
shut down your nuclear weapons program and put all your reactors under
international inspection, or we will turn off your lights, cut off your heat and
put your whole country on a diet. Have we made ourselves clear? One thing
we know about China-it knows how to play hardball when it wants to, and
if China played hardball that way with North Korea, the proliferation threat
from Pyongyang would be over.
Thomas L. Friedman, Brussels Sprouts, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2005, at A19. In fact,
Beijing tolerates the North Korean weapons program.
103. Becker, supra note 61, a t 221.
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Initiative's enlargement. In the early nineteenth century,
hegemonic Britain was the first state to take bold and
destabilizing steps to end the trans-Atlantic slave trade.lo4Over
the years that followed, Britain was able to transform this moral
preference into a universal norm. The impulse to end
proliferation, however, faces two obstacles that the opposition to
slave trade never had to address. First, as noted above, today's
robust system of international law strongly favors
noninterference in other states' affairs and freedom of the
105
seas. Second, also noted above, it seeks to implement change
in the long-standing and comprehensive global political system
in which each state has equal status. Britain's unilateral policy
to halt the slave trade was developed at a time when the legal,
political, and military systems governing international relations
were inchoate.lo6For the PSI to gain effectiveness today, its
actions must be grounded in international law and minimize its
destabilizing effects.
The significance of an interdiction of WMD depends on
where the acts take place. For interdictions at sea, this depends
in turn on the vessel's location and the flag it flies. The location
presents the first threshold issue. There are three categories of
waters in which a vessel might be found. First, a country's
"territorial sea" includes its ports and harbors and extends
twelve miles out from the coast.lo7Within its territorial seas, a
state's authority is at its zenith. Second, a maritime state's
"contiguous zone" extends out across the next twelve miles of
108
ocean. Within this zone, states may police waters for customs,
immigration and sanitation laws.logThird, on the high seas, no
104. See Lee A. Casey & David B. Rivkin, Jr., The Limits of Legitmacy: The Rome
Statute's Unlawful Application to Non-State Parties, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 63,69(2003).
105. Cf:Coogan, supra note 96,at 31,32.
106. See Patricia M. Muhammad, Esq., The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade: A
Forgotten Crime Against Humanity as Defined by International Law, 19 AM. U . INm L.
REV. 883,930(2004).
107. U.N.Convention on the Law of the Seas, arts. 2-3, 11, Dec. 10, 1982, U . N .
Doc. NConf. 621122, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982)[hereinafter
UNCLOS].
108. Id. art. 33.
SECURITY
109. See Joel A. Doolin, OPERATIONAL ART FOR THE PROLIFERATION
INITIATIVE 4 (May 3,2004)(unpublished student paper, Naval War College), available at

Heinonline - -

28

Hous. J. Int'l L.

806 2006

20061

PROLIFERA TION SECURITY ZNTIA TIVE

807

one has authority over vessels flying the flag of another state
except as discussed be10w.l'~
In the territorial sea area of a state-up to approximately
twelve miles from the coastline-foreign ships in so-called
innocent passage are generally presumed exempt from boarding
or seizures.'" A government may search and seize a vessel found
within its own territorial waters, subject only to 1)a reasonable
claim that such vessel's transit is "prejudicial to the peace, good
order or security of the coastal State" and to 2) any domestic law
constraints, such as criminal procedure, due process, unlawful
searches, and takings.''' If either of these conditions is met, then
the coastal state may board a ship or permit another state to do
so. With permission or even pre-authorization from the
government of the state in whose territorial waters the ship is
sailing, another power may search and even seize that vessel.
For example, Kuwait and the Emirates could give the policing
powers permission to board the ships of smugglers, pirates, and
other miscreants sailing within twelve miles of their coastlines
in the Persian Gulf. While suspicious vessels would quickly
learn of this possibility, their course adjustments to avoid these
waters might give the United States additional insights about
which ships to track. While this information may not lead to an
immediate interdiction, it might prove useful at a later date. It
would also raise additional obstacles and thus the costs of
trafficking in WMD.
The first of these conditions-a claim that the ship poses a
threat to safety or security--can readily be overcome if the state
credibly claims that a vessel is carrying WMD. Article 19 of the
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) defines innocent passage:
(1)Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to
the peace, good order or security of the coastal State.
Such passage shall take place in conformity with this
http://www.fas.org/man/eprint/doolin.pdf. Also extending 188 miles beyond the twelvemile limits of the territorial seas is an exclusive economic zone. Id. a t 17.
110. Coogan, supra note 96, a t 17.
111. UNCLOS, supra note 107, art. 17.
112. See UNCLOS, supra note 107, art. 19 ("Passage is innocent so long a s it is not
prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal state.").
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Convention and with other rules of international law.
(2) Passage of a foreign ship shall be considered to be
prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the
coastal State if in the territorial sea it engages in any of
the following activities: (a) any threat or use of force
against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political
independence of the coastal State, or in any other
manner in violation of the principles of international
law embodied in the [I9451 Charter of the United
~ations."ll~
Article 2 1 continues to permit
[tlhe coastal State [to] adopt laws and regulations, in
conformity with the provisions of this Convention and
other rules of international law, relating to innocent
passage through the territorial sea, in respect of all or
any of the following: (a) the safety of navigation and the
regulation of maritime traffic; . . . (d) the conservation
of the living resources of the sea; . . . (f) the preservation
of the environment of the coastal State and the
prevention, reduction and control of pollution
thereof; . . . [or] (h) the prevention of infringement of
the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and
regulations of the coastal state.l14
While none seem to be precisely on point in the abstract, in
actuality, a state should have no difficulty shoehorning the
threat of WMD into one of these justifications.
In the contiguous zones-extending generally twelve miles
out from the territorial seas-a state may "exercise the control
necessary to: (a) prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal,
immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within its
territory or territorial sea; (b) punish infringement of the above
laws and regulations committed within its territory or territorial
sea."'15 Once again, lawyers will likely find justifications for
boarding a ship carrying WMD in the contiguous zone of their
state.
On the other hand, stopping, boarding, or seizing a ship on

113. Id.
114. See UNCLOS,supra note 107,art. 21.
115. U N C L O S , supra note 107,art. 33.
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the high seas that is suspected of carrying WMD presents a
variety of thorny issues. As the UNCLOS"~ explicitly notes, "The
high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or land-locked.
Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid
down by this Convention and by other rules of international law.
It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and land-locked States:
(a) freedom of navigation . . . .,3117 There are notable exceptions to
the general rule of freedom of navigation. First of all, the
captain or the owner of a ship can waive it. There may be
instances when that permission could be secured; for instance,
when the boarding party notifies the owner or captain that the
ship is suspected of carrying contraband. The boarding party
may board the ship by surprise or the owner or captain may
voluntarily submit his ship to boarding so as to avoid the
consequences of incurring the boarding party's displeasure.
Likewise, permission to interdict could be secured from
appropriate authorities of the government that have registered
the ship. Interdiction is also permissible where reasonable
engaging in
grounds exist to suspect"8 a ship of ~tatelessness,~'~
slave trade,lZ0 shipping narcotic drugs or psychotropic
sub~tances,'~'committing unauthorized broadcasting,'22 or
The legal test for seizure is higher.
Indeed, it was an event such as this that triggered the
formation of the PSI. Acting on a tip from U.S. intelligence,
Spanish special forces boarded a North Korean vessel, the So
116. The United States is among the few nations not party to this convention, but
it is bound by many of its provisions to the extent that they codify customary
international law or that it is a party to other relevant treaties. Jack I. Gamey, The
International Institution Imperative for Countering the Spread of Weapons of Mass
Destruction: Assessing the Proliferation Security Initiative, 10 J . OF CONFLICT& SEC. L.
125, 147 n.27 (2005).
117. See UNCLOS, supra note 107, art. 87.
118. The reasonable ground to suspect standard for establishing a right to visit is
found in UNCLOS, Art. 110. See UNCLOS, supra note 107, art. 110.
119. See id. art. 92.
120. See id. art. 99.
121. See id. art. 108.
122. See id. art. 109.
123. See id. arts. 100-10 (Piracy is defined clearly and narrowly and cannot easily
be read to include acts that would put WMD in the hands of non-state actors or other
entities that should not have them).
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Sun, on the high seas in 2002.'~~
They were justified in doing so
because the So Sun was flying different flags and otherwise
masking its state.'25However, once the Spanish determined that
the So Sun was carrying Scud missiles to Yemen and that there
was no legal justification for keeping these missiles from
Yemen's government, the Spaniards were obliged to let the So
Sun continue its voyage and deliver the
The characterization of certain actors as pirates and certain
terrorist acts as piracy presents a couple of intriguing
possibilities for punishing or preventing future acts of terrorism.
Professor Ruth Wedgwood labeled A1 Qaeda a pirate
organization and the attacks of 9/11 piracy, concluding that
members of Osama Bin Laden's network were enemies of
ci~ilization.'~~
While Professor Wedgwood's thesis was not
universally accepted, it retains considerable heuristic value and
may provide a roadmap for building support for the policing of
those who engage in terrorist acts. At the level of a plain
language interpretation, it is, however, incorrect in light of the
UNCLOS's narrow and explicit definition of piracy.'28Likewise,
her definition is not particularly useful when seeking to
interdict WMD at sea because either a vessel does or does not
have the protection of a state. If it has that protection, then it
cannot be labeled a pirate ship.
If a vessel has no state protection, international law offers
no protection other than the dictates of universal human rights.
One way to make use of piracy laws, along with universal
jurisdiction, lies in getting every state to renounce any
organization that uses or threatens to use violence against
civilian noncombatants. The same sort of step was taken in the
Paris Declaration of 1856 when the major maritime powers
forever renounced privateering and effectively made piracy a

124. See Samuel E. Logan, The Proliferation Security Initiative: Navigating the
Legal Challenges, 14 J . TRANSNAT'L
L. & POL'Y 253,253 (2005).
125. See UNCLOS, supra note 107, art. 92
126. Logan, supra note 124, at 263-54.
127. See Ruth Wedgwood, Agora: Military Commissions: A1 Qaeda, Terrorism, and
Military Commissions, 96 AM. J . INT'L L. 328, 329 (2002).
128. See UNCLOS, supra note 107, art. 100-10.
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universal crime.12' The challenge of building universal consensus
has prevented the U.N. Security Council from defining terrorism
and will probably prevent the building of consensus for labeling
WMD trafficking as piracy. On the other hand, the Security
Council already has the authority to permit interdictions of
WMD on the high seas. The Security Council could simply pass
a resolution authorizing all necessary means to staunch the flow
of WMD-an option it failed to exercise when it passed UNSCR
1540.

C. Interdiction as Self-Defense
Short of an explicit U.N. Security Council Resolution, there
are other legal arguments to support interdictions. The 1945
Charter itself seeks not to ban the use of force but merely to
"ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of
methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common
interest. . . ."130 It goes on to acknowledge that "[nlothing in the

129. See Douglas R. Burgess, Jr., The Dread Pirate Bin Laden: How Thinking of
Terrorists as Pirates Can Help Win the War on Terror, LEGAL AFF., JulyIAug. 2005,
available a t http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/July-August-2OO5/feature~burgess~
julaug05.msp. Burgess unfortunately seems to think that the problem is as simple a s
getting all states to agree that something called terrorism is akin to piracy and should be
banned. He seems oblivious to the difficulty states have in defining terrorism and that
states support these acts because they believe the acts to be in their interest. In 1856,
the United States actually refused to accept the Declaration of Paris formally because it
was unready to forswear privateering. See Coogan, supra note 96, a t 22. Customary
international law quickly developed on this matter as the U.S. government renounced
privateers once and for all during the Civil War when the Confederate states used this
tool of war to great effect. In its opposition to the Confederacy's privateers, the U.S.
government gave up its claim to persistent and unambiguous objections to the new norm
against privateers. Customary international law progressed apace unimpeded by
American constraints. The evolution of technology helped in this process a s ships of war
became increasingly expensive and specialized. I t no longer made sense for commercial
ships to pick up a few cannons and join a war effort. The guns grew too large for
retrofitting and were of little use without armor plating the walls of a ship. For more on
the technological transformations of this era, see MARK R. SHULMAN,NAVALISM
AND THE
EMERGENCEOF AMERICANSEAPOWER, 1882-1893 (1995).
Coincidently, Paris is also where the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles was
originally announced. John R. Bolton, Under Sec'y for Arms Control and Int'l Sec.
Affairs, Remarks a t Proliferation Security Initiative Meeting (Sept. 4, 2003),
http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/23801.htm.
130. U.N. Charter art. 51 (emphasis added).
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present charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a
Member of the United Nations . . . ."131 The definition of those
principles and methods as well as the significance of this
inherent right remains contested.
Perhaps the inherent right includes a right to launch
preventive war under some circumstances. The doctrine of
preventive war remains an arrow in the quiver of U.S. national
security strategy. But as a matter of operational reality, it
appears to have been exhausted-at least for now. The failure to
find WMD in Iraq, the lack of broad support for the U.S.-led war
in Iraq, and the serious drain on resources imposed by the ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq makes preventive war
extremely unlikely in the near future. The prospect of a
preventive war may re-emerge at some late date, but it appears
to have no more political legitimacy than it would have had prior
to 9/11. In light of the embarrassing failure to locate WMD, it
seems unlikely that preventive war will develop the political
support necessary to help promote the tenuous legal argument.
On the other hand, efforts to legitimate a preventative seizure of
a shipment of previously identified WMD would not face such
high hurdles.
The use of force under the PSI may or may not fall under the
classical definition of anticipatory self-defense, depending on the
circumstances and facts.13' As a basis for the use of force, the
justification for self-defense has traditionally been judged by the
rule of the Caroline: the use of force in anticipation of an attack
is constrained by proportionality and by a requirement that the
threat "leav[es] no choice of means, and no moment for
deliberati~n."'~~
Surely, anticipatory self-defense would justify
U.S. destruction of a North Korean naval vessel carrying
nuclear tipped missiles toward San Francisco, even absent a

131. U.N. Charter pmbl.
132. See Michael Byers, Policing the High Seas: The Proliferation Security
Initiative, 98 AM. J. INT'L L.526, 541 (2004).
133. Letter, with enclosures, from Daniel Webster to Lord Ashburton (July 27,
1842) (compiled by the Avalon Project at Yale Law School), available at
http://www.yale.ed~awweb/avalon/diplomacymritia~r-1842d.htm
(giving context and
correspondence surrounding this seminal exchange).
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declaration of war. Short of that clear-cut case, however,
anticipatory self-defense may not legitimate an interdiction on
the high seas.

D. Boarding Agreements
Many merchant ships fly flags of convenience to avoid taxes,
laws regulating work conditions of their crew, or environmental
regulations, or any combination thereof. Some small states
register these ships for small sums that add up to a significant
revenue stream. Even though they were selected based on the
implied promise that they will not inconvenience ship owners,
these states retain the legal authority to board ships carrying
their flags.134Moreover, they are able to delegate all of their
authority if they wish. To date, five leading flag states have
signed boarding agreements, including ~ i b e r i a and
'~~
As a consequence, a large portion of the global merchant fleet is
flagged by states that either support the PSI or have signed
boarding agreements. More than half the world's shipping fleet,
by weight, is liable to boarding with minimal 0bstac1es.l~~
Interdiction of WMD aboard these vessels no longer presents
serious legal obstacles.
One should pause to note the tremendous feat of diplomacy
that has given the PSI members legal authority to board any of
134. UNCLOS, supra note 107,at 94,217
135. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Republic of Liberia Concerning Cooperation To Suppress the
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Their Delivery Systems, and Related
Materials by Sea, US.-Liber., Feb. 11,2004,http://www.state.gov/t/isn/trty/32403.htm.
136. Amendment to the Supplementary Arrangement Between the Government of
the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Panama to the
Arrangement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of Panama for Support and Assistance from the United States Coast Guard
for the National Maritime Service of the Ministry of Government and Justice, US.-Pan.,
May 12, 2004, http://www.state.gov/t/isn/trty/32858.htm. As of July 25, 2005, five
countries have signed ship-boarding agreements with the United States in conjunction
with the PSI. Cyprus was the fifth country to sign a ship-boarding agreement; previous
agreements have been concluded with Liberia, Panama, the Marshall Islands, and
Croatia. Media Note, U.S. Dep't of State, The United States and the Republic of Cyprus
Proliferation Security Initiative Ship Boarding Agreement (July 25, 20051,
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/50035.htm.
137. Becker, supra note 61,a t 182;see generally Doolin, supra note 109,at 5.
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thousands of ships. If finding WMD is like searching for needles
in a haystack, it is worth noting that the PSI members may now
X-ray large portions of that haystack. The timid might demur at
the level of persuasion that may have been applied in order to
obtain signatures on these boarding agreements, but no one has
claimed Liberia and Panama signed under duress. Such a claim
might have the effect of nullifjrlng the agreements.13'
This situation also raises the interesting issue as to whether
one state can simply purchase some of another state's rights.
International law does not specifically disallow the purchase
from a state of the right to board a vessel bearing its flag. So
what is to stop South Korea from offering to purchase this right
from North Korea in exchange for a steady supply of food and
energy? For those trying to figure out how the fifty-year war in
Korea might end in a whimper rather than in a bang, this could
present an intriguing possibility. Likewise, what is to keep the
United States from making boarding permission a condition of
continued participation in regional security or even free trade
areas?

E. Strengthening the PSI'S Legitimacy
A political scientist may question why the PSI should seek
legal authority in the first place. After all, laws are not death
pacts, and the consequences of WMD falling into the hands of a
terrorist organization are unfathomable. Moreover, even leading
international rule of law jurists recognize that "a violation of the
law is not necessarily always deplorable and may even be a good
thing."13' The response, of course, is that by bringing the law in
accord with policy, one continues to support a system of lawsone which generally benefits those seeking to maintain peace
and security.
More formal and traditional initiatives to permit
interdictions are also being pursued. Along with the United

138. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 52, 1155
U.N.T.S.331, available at h t t p : / / u n t r e a t y . u n . o r g / i l d t e x t s l i n s t ~ e n t i o n
dl-1-1969.pdf hereinafter Vienna Convention].
139. Thomas M. Franck, Humanitarian and Other Interventions, 43 COLUM.J.
TRANSNAPL
L. 321,325 (2005).
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States, the London-based International Maritime Organization
has proposed amending the International Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation to criminalize the illegal proliferation of WMD at
sea.140 This laudable effort may succeed but only to the extent of
permitting boarding or interdiction upon flag state consent.
What proliferating state will voluntarily give up this right? Each
of these PSI agreements is shrinking the sphere of freedom in
which proliferation can occur. At the present rate of progress,
that space may eventually become so small that world opinion
considers counter-proliferation to be a base norm. This shift
would make it much easier for the United States or "like-minded
countries" to seek a specific resolution of the Security Council to
target the ships of one rogue state. Making a similar argument,
the Bush Administration has cited the Security Council
Presidential Statement of 1992 as authority for such
interdictions.14' The Security Council itself did likewise when
passing UNSCR 1540. But the value of the Presidential
Statement is debatable and highlights the fact that much work
remains to establish the authority to interdict WMD at sea.
On the other hand, if the PSI does signal a move away from
centralized decision-making on issues related to international
peace and security, then it may be more worthwhile to pursue
regional arrangements rather than a global solution. Article 52
of the 1945 U.N. Charter preserves the right of regional
organizations or arrangements to deal with the maintenance of
international peace and security as appropriate for regional
So a regional security
action such as that performed by NATO.'~~
organization, acting with the specific authorization of each state
in the region, might declare a Nuclear Free Zone (NFZ) and
request that the Security Council help enforce it. The Security
Council could in turn pass a resolution pursuant to its authority
under Chapter VII of the Charter to authorize the use of all
necessary means to enforce the regional ban on W M D . ' ~ Or,
~
states in a given region could act without explicit resolution,
140.
141.
142.
143.

See Esper & Allen, supra note 73, at 5.
See Prosser & Scoville, supra note 21.
U.N. Charter art. 52.
Id. art. 40.
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supported by the claim that they retain the right to do so, much
as NATO did in 1999 to prevent genocide in ~ o s o v o . Lately
'~~
some states have been working to establish an NFZ throughout
the entire southern hemisphere. The United States, Great
Britain, and France have consistently blocked such efforts in
order to ensure that their own nuclear forces remain
~nencumbered.'~~
What would happen if the Security Council
were able to establish such an NFZ in which it could license
certain states to carry nuclear weapons or other WMD under
certain circumstances? Even in states that ban individual
ownership of guns, law enforcement officers are permitted to
carry them. Such a system would allow the nuclear states to
have their proverbial cake (WMD), and eat it too (refuse WMD
to others).
The United States is already pursuing a different and yet
equally innovative regional policy. Pacific Command's (PACOM)
Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) is building a
"coalition of the willing" to counter transnational threats,
including terrorism, maritime piracy, illegal traffic in narcotics,
weapons, humans, and illicit cargo and other criminal activities
in the Asia-Pacific region.146The overall goal is t o develop a
partnership of willing nations who work together "to identify,
monitor, and intercept transnational maritime threats under
international and domestic law."147By increasing the range of
states and organizations participating in this initiative and by
expanding the scope of activities it undertakes, the United
States appears to be creating the structure upon which the PSI
can be implemented. Given the vast portion of the world within
PACOM's purview-stretching fiom the littorals of the Indian
144. William H. TaR, IV, Symposium Remark "The United States and
International Law: Confronting Global Challenges," 36 GEO.J. INT'L L. 659,661(2005).
145. Indeed, these and other powers have also worked t o preserve the right of
unfettered transit o f nuclear materials through the high seas and Exclusive Economic
Zones o f coastal states. See ChaEee, supra note 33.
146. See RMSZ, supra note 39;see also Toshi Yoshihara & James Holmes, Islands
Only Look Peaceful; Japan Needs U.S. to Anchor Territorial Tug-of-war With China,
ATLANTAJ.-CONST.,Feb. 18,2005,at A19.
147. Admiral Tom Fargo, USN Commander, U.S.Pacific Command, Address at
Military Operations and Law Conference,(May 3,2001),http://131.84.1.218/speeches/sst
2004/040503milops.shtml;see also RMSZ, supra note 39.

Heinonline - -

28

Hous. J. Int'l L.

816 2006

20061

PROLIFERA TION SECURITY INTIA TIVE

817

Ocean through the South Pacific and as far north as the Bering
Sea-the
ambition is breathtaking. It is one thing for
Washington to issue a directive with global scope. It is entirely
another to develop operational capacity to implement it in
dozens of countries and nearly one-hundred million square miles
of earth and sea.'*' U.S. PACOM is undertaking cooperative
efforts with regional partners to increase situational awareness
and information sharing, to develop responsive decision-making
architecture within the region, to enhance maritime interception
capacity, and to increase agency, ministerial, and international
cooperation.149Little information is publicly available with
which to evaluate the RMSI's progress in these laudable efforts.
Yet it seems noteworthy that a military commander-not a
professional diplomat-is taking the lead on this important
multilateral diplomatic initiative.l5' While the RMSI's official
strategy paper mentions the PSI only as one of a number of
"cooperative security activities" it "complements," the RMSI
appears to be the principal mechanism through which the
United States is institutionalizing the PSI agenda.151 At the
same time, it offers an innovative next step. One of its stated
objectives is to "develop seamless partnerships between
governments and the private sector to balance maritime safety
and security with free trade."152As such it echoes other U.S.
initiatives such as the Container Security Initiative and the
Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism in their efforts to
bridge the divides between the government and the private
~ect0r.l~~

148. See Yoshihara & Holmes, supra note 146, at A19; see also Naval
Meteorology and Oceanography Command Homepage, Oceans of the World,
http://pao.cnmoc.navy.mil/pao/Educate/Ocndexoceans.htm (last visited Apr. 2,
2006).
149. Tom Fargo, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, Speech a t the Military
Operations and Law Conference, Victoria, British Columbia (May 3, 2004),
http://www.pacom.miVspeeches/sst2004040503mi1ops.shtm1.
150. See generally U.S. Pacific Command, http://www.pacom.mil (containing
various documents and reports on RMSI) (last visited Apr. 2,2006).
151. U.S. Pacific Command, RMSZ, supra note 39, a t 13.
152. Id. a t 7.
153. In January 2002, the Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection
announced the creation of the Container Security Initiative (CSI). Through the CSI
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It will be fascinating to watch how U.S. PACOM handles a
public-private partnership. It will also be interesting to see how
various agencies of the U.S. government coordinate these
initiatives, given their overlapping interest in maritime security.
Likewise, it will be interesting to see if the PSI serves as a
model for the formation of peace and security policy and
international law in an era increasingly characterized by weak
global organizations and renewed challenges to international
law.
VI. UNITEDNATIONS
AND PROLIFERATION
The Initiative's supporters are pursuing a variety of means
to build legitimacy and political support. In addition to the
boarding agreements, international conventions, and regional
arrangements discussed above, they have been working to build
support in the U.N. Security Council.

A. Security Council Efforts
On April 28, 2004, the U.N. Security Council unanimously
passed one of the most sweeping resolutions in its history.154
Basing its authority on Chapter VII of the 1945 Charter,
UNSCR 1540 decided that all states shall (1) refrain from
providing support to non-states seeking WMD; (2) adopt laws
prohibiting non-state actors from acquiring WMD; and (3) take
measures to prevent proliferation.155Only UNSCR 1373-passed
in the immediate wake of 9111--comes anywhere close to
UNSCR 1540 in its ambition.156Not only does it take a position
maritime containers that pose a risk for terrorism are identified and examined a t foreign
ports before they are shipped to the United States. See U.S. CUSTOMSFACTSHEET,supra
note 37.
154. For the complete text of this path breaking resolution, see S.C. Res. 1540,
supra note 49. The ultimate resolution was cosponsored by France, the Philippines,
Romania, the Russian Federation, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
155. S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 49.
156. Passed on September 28, 2001, the resolution required states to ensure that
their banks do not facilitate the financing of terrorist operations, that they do not permit
terrorists to travel, and that terrorists are unable to train within their territory.
Resolution 1373 appears to be the first attempt of the Security Council to do anything
resembling legislating, but this innovation has not been widely commented upon,
probably because it was passed in the shadow of 9/11. See S.C. Res. 1373 U.N. Doc.
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on behalf of the Security Council, it requires all states to pass
domestic legislation to support its policy determinations. Prior
to these resolutions, most experts would have agreed with the
conclusion that there is "no legislature, in the technical sense of
the term, in the United Nations system . . . . That is to say, there
exists no corporate organ formally empowered to enact laws
directly binding on international legal subject^."'^^ Ironically,
President Bush and John Bolton, two determined critics of the
United Nations, have radically expanded its capacity to act as a
world government.I5'
UNSCR 1540 originated in a proposal made by President
Bush to the U.N. General Assembly in September 2003. He
explained the new PSI briefly and requested that the Security
Council "adopt a new anti-proliferation resolution . . . [that
would] call on all members of the U.N. to criminalize the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to enact strict
export controls consistent with international standards, and to
secure any and all sensitive materials within their own

S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28,2001).
157. Stefan Talmon, The Security Council As World Legislature, 99 AM. J. INT'L L.
175, 175 (2005) (citing Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-1, Decision on Defence
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, '$43 (Oct. 2, 1995) reprinted in 35 I.L.M.
32 (1996)).
As Talmon notes, the new "legislationn differs from previous requirements that states
enact legislation in that it does not refer to specific targets of such enactments by name.
The obligations imposed are general and abstract. See id. a t 176. Instead of enacting
sanctions against Libya or the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the
Palestinian territories, 1373 and 1540 refer to "terroristn organizations. Id. at 176.
158. Expanding the legal capacity, however, does not imply expanding the
organizational capacity to ensure compliance with this virtual "legislation." Both
Resolutions 1373 and 1540 require extensive reporting requirements of each state. And,
like unfunded mandates, they do not provide the support necessary for poor countries to
report-let alone to comply with their terms. At least for 1540, PSI can provide material
assistance in complying. But there remains a yawning gap in the ability of poor countries
to effectively report on their efforts. Without adequate resources for reporting, there is
little ability for the United States and other concerned powers to benchmark or
otherwise improve compliance. As a consequence, there is a real need for some
nongovernmental organization, philanthropy or pro bono practice to help the poor
countries report on their efforts to enact and abide by Resolutions 1373 and 1540. See
S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 49; see also S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 156.
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borders."159In doing so, President Bush explicitly tied UNSCR
1540 to the PSI. There are no established rules of interpretation
for Security Council resolution^.'^^ That said, it does seem
significant that the resulting resolution actually goes further
than merely to "call on all members." Instead it "[dlecides. . .
that all States, in accordance with their national procedures,
shall adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws which
prohibit any non-state actor to manufacture, acquire, possess,
develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or
biological weapons and their means of delivery, in particular for
terrorist purposes . . . .7 ~ 1 6 1In light of the importance of the issues
addressed, the level of public scrutiny involved, and the legal
novelty of UNSCR 1540, it seems fair to conclude that the
Security Council was endorsing the PSI. Does this
comprehensive endorsement extend to a delegation of Chapter
VII authority to the PSI'S decision makers? Would it allow the
United States and other directly interested states to use force to
interdict passage of a nuclear weapon (or a Scud missile) on its
way to Yemen or Somalia?

B. Does UNSCR 1540 Fully Legitimate Forceable Counterproliferation?
Apparently not. Or rather, not yet. A British statement
issued at the time was intended to reassure those who resisted
an explicit authorization of interdictions on the high seas. "What
this resolution does not do is authorise enforcement action
against states or against non-state actors in the territory of
another country. The resolution makes clear that it will be the
Council that monitors its implementation. Any enforcement
action would require a new Council decision."162Indeed, the

159. George W. Bush, President of the U S . , Address to the United Nations General
Assembly (Sept. 23, 2003), available at http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/58/statementd
usaeng030923.htm.
160. The U.N. Charter is a treaty and as such should be interpreted in good faith,
in accordance with ordinary means, and in light of its purpose. Presumably, resolutions
passed under its authority should also be interpreted in light of their purpose. Vienna
Convention, supra note 138, arts. 3(b), 31.
161. S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 49, ¶ 2.
162. Adam Thomson, Deputy Permanent &presentative of the U.K Mission of Gr.
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United States dropped a provision explicitly authorizing the
interdiction of WMD at sea in exchange for China's vote.163The
United States was only able to salvage a provision in paragraph
ten that "calls upon all States, in accordance with their national
legal authorities and legislation and consistent with
international law, to take cooperative action to prevent illicit
trafficking in nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, their
means of delivery, and related materials . . . ."164 UNSCR 1540
falls short of authorizing interdictions. But, State Department
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Andrew Semmel's
characterization seems fair: "The PSI and 1540 are
complementary. Paragraph ten of the resolution reflects this
symbiosis.n165
What further authorization would be required to authorize
interdictions? While a new resolution pursuant to Chapter VII
would undoubtedly suffice, perhaps a less sweeping measure
would also work. Paragraph 2 of Article 27 of the 1945 Charter
allows the Security Council to decide "procedural matters" by a
At some point, the Security Council may decide
mere majority.166
that the implementation of UNSCR 1540 by applying the PSI to
specific situations (for example, to North Korean exports) is a
mere procedural matter.
UNSCR 1540 raises several other significant issues. Most
notably, it requires states to prohibit proliferation to non-state
actors-in effect legislating for members. The 1945 Charter,
Brit. and N. Ir., Statement to the Security Council of the U.N. (Apr. 22,2004), available
a t http://www.ukun.or9/articles~show.asp?Sarticlee=l7&icleID=7.Recall that
this discussion followed the intense debate about UNSCR 1441's authorization of force to
compel Saddam Hussein's Iraq to abandon its WMD programs. Much of the Iraq debate
turned on whether 1441 sufficed to authorize military action or a second resolution was
required. See S.C. Res. 1441, U.N. Doc. SIRES11441 (Nov. 8,2002).
163. Sean D. Murphy ed., UN Security Council Resolution on Nonproliferation of
WMD, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 606, 606 (2004) (citing Colum Lynch, Weapons Transfers
Targeted, WASH. POST,Apr. 29,2004, a t A21).
164. S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 49, ¶ 10.
165. Andrew Semmel, Principal Deputy Assistant Sec'y of State for Nuclear
Nonproliferation, U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540: The U.S. Perspective, Remarks
a t Conference on Global Nonproliferation and Counterterrorism: United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1540 delivered a t Chatham House, London (Oct. 12, 2004),
available a t http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/rm/37145.htm.
166. U.N. Charter art. 27, para. 2.
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however, does not grant the Security Council authority to
legislate. As a nuclear power and a nonpermanent member of
the Security Council, Pakistan raised this issue.167Nor does the
1945 Charter provide the United Nations with the democratic
apparatus generally required for legislatures to make legitimate
law-at least in many states. Some arms control advocates
worry that Security Council legislation is inherently
undemocratic, that 1540 may undermine the multilateral
treaties already binding states to limit proliferation, and that
1540 undervalues the significant obligation of states to reduce
168
and eventually eliminate their own nuclear arsenals. It seems
unfair, however, to categorize UNSCR 1540 as undermining
existing multilateral treaties merely by binding certain states to
limit proliferation.

VII. CONCLUSIONS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The PSI'S participants are building legal and political
support for highly-focused use of force operations to counter the
proliferation of WMD. Eventually, these efforts may mature into
the formation of clear and substantive law permitting highlyfocused military operations anywhere in the world in order to
halt the flow or prevent the use of WMD. Analogous movements
in previous centuries took decades to ripen into universal bans
on piracy and the international slave trade. Over the past half
century, a similar norm has been developing to prevent
genocide. The struggles to end piracy, the slave trade, and
genocide have required decades. The threat of WMD is so great
and so imminent that we do not have decades for the norm to
mature. This recognition leads to several tentative conclusions.

A. Put the Cat Back in the Bag
Certainly international peace and security would be well
served were North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons
program. Should that objective not be achieved, any agreement

167. See Murphy, supra note 163, at 607.
168. See John Burroughs, Executive Dir., Lawyers' Comm. on Nuclear Policy,
Statement at U.N. Correspondents' Association (Mar. 31, 2004), http://www.reaching
criticalwill.org/politica1~SC/SC.html#john~statement.
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with North Korea that acknowledges its right to retain its
nuclear weapons program should include a requirement that
North Korea consent to having its outbound vessels boarded and
any WMD seized. After all, counter-proliferation makes sense
only where the cat has not already been let out of the bag. In the
case of North Korea, the cat is out of the bag, so the concern now
is to bag the cat on the Korean Peninsula. In the alternative, a
specific U.N. Security Council Resolution could endorse
interdictions or an embargo on North Korea. Perhaps China
could be convinced to abstain from a veto if the current round of
negotiations fail.

B. Embrace International Law
Counter-proliferation will be best served by harnessing
international conventions, not marginalizing them. The
UNCLOS should be supported in part because it offers a legal
framework for further legitimating the PSI. Unlike all but two
members of NATO and 145 other nations, the United States is
not a party to the UNCLOS. When the treaty opened for
signature in 1982, President Ronald Reagan's Special Envoy on
the Law of the Sea Treaty, Donald Rumsfeld, worked to
dissuade other countries from signing based on the claim that it
would insufficiently protect U.S. interests.16' As Secretary of
Defense in 2003, Mr. Rumsfeld reversed this position, deeming
the treaty's protection of navigation rights as "critical to the
~ ~ and a half years later,
United States Armed ~ o r c e s . " 'Two
however, the Administration has not moved to ratify the treaty,
despite claims that "it provides the only legitimate international
In this instance, it appears
framework for the [~lnitiative."~~~
169. See Ed Feulner, Out to Sea, WASH.TIMES,Mar. 8. 2005.
170. John A. Duff, A Note on the United States and the Law of the Sea: Looking
Back and Moving Forward, 35 OCEANDEV. & INT'L L. 195, 201 (2004)(quoting U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea Hearing, Testimony of Mark T. Esper, Deputy
Assistant Sec'y of Def. for Negotiation Policy (Oct. 21, 2003), http://foreign.senate.
gov/testimony/2003/EsperTestimony031021.pdf).
171. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted nineteen to zero to
recommend the United States enter the UNCLOS. Lawrence J . Korb, Bush Failing at
Nuclear Security, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 2, 2005, a t C11; see also Senator Richard G.
Lugar, Law of the Sea Treaty Balances U.S. and World Interests, GLOBALISSUES, Apr.
2004,http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itgidO404/ijgelgi02.htm.
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that the Administration's antipathy to multilateral conventions
is undermining its capacity to develop a robust coalition of the
willing. The United States should ratify the UNCLOS.

C. Broaden the Base
The PSI has made great progress in terms of effectiveness
and gaining international legitimacy. Widening the coalition
beyond states would only enhance its effectiveness and may also
accelerate the formation of norms essential for its eventual
acceptance as entirely legitimate. If the PSI is to succeed, it
means rethinking certain elemental components of the
international legal regime. It means authorizing actions that
previously would have been undertaken only under the rubric of
war or deniable covert action. It means continuing to build a
robust coalition of willing states that have few or no strong
obligations to each other and one based on limited common
interests or purposes. Some of the Initiative's participants, such
as the small countries that offer flags of convenience, may even
have been coerced into joining. PSI'S supporters should work
toward universal acceptance of its principles.

D. Open up the Discussion
Exposing the PSI to a wider range of input should increase
international confidence in it and enhance its effectiveness.
Building it into a formal agreement with North Korea would
give it additional legitimacy and help limit the proliferation of
WMD. Revealing the levels of support for the PSI around the
world would help establish the norm necessary for the creation
of universal law. Dedicating resources to help poor or weak
states conform to the requirements of UNSCR 1540 would give
additional legitimacy to the Security Council's ambitious
legislative effort and presumably give the PSI supporters more
congenial legal frameworks. Likewise, opening up the Initiative
to participation by nongovernmental organizations would also
accelerate the norm-setting process and increase the PSI'S
capabilities.
To ensure responsiveness, efficiency, effectiveness, and
fairness-and to capture the most synergies-the PSI'S leaders
should convene some sort of congress to discuss it, to bring up
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new and useful ideas, and to work through the concerns of
participants. Moreover, participation in the PSI and in this
congress ought not to be limited to states' governments. Many
international organizations, such as the United Nations'
General Secretariat and the Tribunal of the Law of the Sea,
regional organizations, humanitarian organizations, and other
elements of civil society are effectively stakeholders, whose
opinions should be consulted. The marketplace of ideas may well
yield ways to improve the PSI. In the end, governments may
ignore their advice, but inviting intelligent and well-intentioned
people with different expertise and interests to share their views
may bring significant and useful insights.
At the same time, the supporters of the PSI could work to
help individual states reform their laws so that they better
conform to the requirements of UNSCR 1540. As noted above,
this resolution
[dlecides also that all States, in accordance with their
national procedures, shall adopt and enforce
appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non-state
actor to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop,
transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological
weapons and their means of delivery, in particular for
terrorist purposes, as well as attempts to engage in any
of the foregoing activities, participate in them as an
accomplice, assist or finance them. . . .172
The Security Council has established a 1540 committee to
monitor compliance. But, many states lack the legal or
institutional capacity to conform in a timely fashion. The PSI'S
effectiveness would be greatly enhanced if it were expanded to
provide the means for these states to adopt appropriate
legislation. This role could easily fit under the Initiative's
mission of information sharing.
The PSI has great potential. To date, however, some of its
potential has been masked by a hesitation to be exposed to the
marketplace of ideas. Little information is publicly available
about the Initiative's intelligence sharing or efforts t o increase
the operational capacity. The Initiative's governance remains

172. S.C. Res. 1540,supra note 49.
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obscured. No complete list of states participating publicly exists,
let alone an official description of what constitutes support or
participation. Exposing the PSI to public scrutiny could help
generate additional new ideas and greater support.

E. A Final Word
The Initiative can play an important role in helping to
staunch the dangerous proliferation of WMD and the means to
create or deliver them. Whether through effective interdictions
or by simply raising the cost above what some terrorists can
afford to pay, it may eventually avoid untold destruction,
suffering, and deaths. At the same time, the PSI can help reform
the international security system by making it more flexible and
responsive to the challenges of the twenty-first century. To
maximize the chances to achieve these critical objectives,
policymakers, soldiers, diplomats, and lawyers should embrace
dialogue and international law, not shun it.
VIII. APPENDIX: INTERDICTION PRINCIPLES
FOR THE
PROLIFERATION
SECURITY
INITIATIVE
PSI participants are committed to the following interdiction
principles to establish a more coordinated and effective basis
through which to impede and stop shipments of WMD, delivery
systems, and related materials flowing to and from states and
non-state actors of proliferation concern, consistent with
national legal authorities and relevant international law and
frameworks, including the UN Security Council. They call on all
states concerned with this threat to international peace and
security t o join in similarly committing to:
Undertake effective measures, either alone or in
1.
concert with other states, for interdicting the
transfer or transport of WMD, their delivery
systems, and related materials to and from states
and non-state actors of proliferation concern.
"States or non-state actors of proliferation concern"
generally refers to those countries or entities that
the PSI participants involved establish should be
subject to interdiction activities because they are
engaged in proliferation through: (1) efforts to
develop or acquire chemical, biological, or nuclear
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weapons and associated delivery systems or (2)
transfers (either selling, receiving, or facilitating) of
WMD, their delivery systems, or related materials.
Adopt streamlined procedures for rapid
exchange of relevant information concerning
suspected proliferation activity, protecting the
confidential character of classified information
provided by other states as part of this initiative,
dedicate appropriate resources and efforts to
interdiction operations and capabilities, and
maximize coordination among participants in
interdiction efforts.
3.
Review and work to strengthen their relevant
national legal authorities where necessary to
accomplish these objectives, and work to strengthen
when necessary relevant international law and
frameworks in appropriate ways to support these
commitments.
4.
Take specific actions in support of interdiction
efforts regarding cargoes of WMD, their delivery
systems, or related materials, to the extent their
national legal authorities permit and consistent
with their obligations under international law and
frameworks, to include:
a. Not to transport or assist in the transport of any
such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors
of proliferation concern, and not to allow any
persons subject to their jurisdiction t o do so.
b. At their own initiative, or at the request and
good cause shown by another state, to take
action to board and search any vessel flying
their flag in their internal waters or territorial
seas, or areas beyond the territorial seas of any
other state, that is reasonably suspected of
transporting such cargoes to or from states or
non-state actors of proliferation concern, and to
seize such cargoes that are identified.
c. To seriously consider providing consent under
the appropriate circumstances to the boarding
and searching of its own flag vessels by other
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states, and to the seizure of such WMD-related
cargoes in such vessels that may be identified by
such states.
d. To take appropriate actions to (1) stop and/or
search in their internal waters, territorial seas,
or contiguous zones (when declared) vessels that
are reasonably suspected of carrying such
cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of
proliferation concern and to seize such cargoes
that are identified; and (2) t o enforce conditions
on vessels entering or leaving their ports,
internal waters or territorial seas that are
reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes,
such as requiring that such vessels be subject to
boarding, search, and seizure of such cargoes
prior to entry.
e. At their own initiative or upon the request and
good cause shown by another state, to (a) require
aircraft that are reasonably suspected of
carrying such cargoes to or from states or nonstate actors of proliferation concern and that are
transiting their airspace to land for inspection
and seize any such cargoes that are identified;
and/or (b) deny aircraft reasonably suspected of
carrying such cargoes transit rights through
their airspace in advance of such flights.
f. If their ports, airfields, or other facilities are
used as transshipment points for shipment of
such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors
of proliferation concern, to inspect vessels,
aircraft, or other modes of transport reasonably
suspected of carrying such cargoes, and to seize
such cargoes that are identified.173

173. STATEMENT
OF INTERDICTION PRINCIPLES, supra note 5.
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